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THE HIGH PRICE OF FREE TRADE: COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING
AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Thomas Gremillion*
ABSTRACT
In 2015, the United States lost a case before the World Trade
Organization (WTO) worth over a billion dollars. Facing the threat of
sanctions from Canada and Mexico, Congress acted quickly to repeal
the offending measure, which required country-of-origin labeling
(COOL) for beef and pork products. Specifically, the law required re-
tailers to label products with information on where animals were born,
raised, and slaughtered. The WTO Appellate Body reasoned that the
costs of complying with COOL, potential labeling inaccuracies, and
the law's exemptions for restaurants and smaller stores, made COOL
an illegal trade barrier. While the Appellate Body recognized that de-
livering information to consumers about the origin of meat is a legiti-
mate objective, it did not indicate what, if any, alternative labeling reg-
ulation might lawfully promote that objective. This article offers a
critical examination of the Appellate Body's analysis, presenting the
evidence in support of COOL as a consumer protection measure, and
contrasting the WTO decision with that of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, which rejected statutory and constitutional challenges to
COOL based on similar claims about its costs and value to consumers.
The article concludes that COOL exemplifies how trade liberalization
agreements can undermine public interest regulation, and that any re-
negotiation of U.S. trade commitments should seek to accommodate a
reinstatement of the law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Trade policy played a prominent role in the ascendancy of Don-
ald J. Trump to the presidency. On the campaign trail, Trump charac-
terized U.S. trade policy as a "betrayal" of American workers, which
eliminated manufacturing jobs and enriched a "financial elite" at the
expense of the middle class.' In exit polling, a majority of Americans
* Director, Food Policy Institute, Consumer Federation of America.
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cited the economy as "the most important issue facing the country," 2
and according to Trump, "[t]rade reform, and the negotiation of Freat
trade deals," would be "the quickest way to bring our jobs back." Ac-
cording to exit polling, voters who agreed with the statement that in-
ternational trade "takes away U.S. jobs" were twice as likely to have
voted for Trump.4
Trump's critique of U.S. trade policy went beyond economic
factors. Promising to "withdraw" from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
trade pact (TPP), Trump explained that the controversial deal would
"undermine our independence" by creating "a new international com-
mission that makes decisions the American people can't veto."' This
rhetoric echoed progressive critiques of the TPP and other trade agree-
ments. According to these critiques, trade agreements go too far in im-
posing limits on food, financial, and other public interest regulations
for the benefit of large corporations and wealthy investors, 6 and they
result in a "race to the bottom" in labor and environmental standards.
By promising, for example, to renegotiate the terms of the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to "end sweatshops in Mexico
that undercut U.S. workers," 7 Trump validated these critiques, and cre-
ated expectations of a U.S. trade policy that would elevate public over
private interests, and more vigorously protect national sovereignty.
As of this writing, Trump has not provided much detail on how
his administration's "great trade deals" will differ from the status quo.
However, policy on mandatory country-of-origin labeling for pork and
beef (COOL) may provide an early indication of the Trump Admin-
istration's trade policy priorities.
i Donald Trump, Declaring American Economic Independence, Presidential
Campaign Speech at Alumisource Factory in Monessen, Pennsylvania (June 28,
2016), transcript available at - https://assets.don-
aldjtrump.com/DJT_DeclaringAmericanEconomiclndependence.pdf
2 Exit Polls, Election 2016, CNN (Nov. 23, 2016, 11:58 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls.
Trump, supra note 1.
4 Exit Polls, supra note 2.
Trump, supra note 1 ("These commissions are great for Hillary Clinton's Wall
Street funders who can spend vast amounts of money to influence the outcomes.").
6 Lori Wallach, Eyes on Trade: Six Things to Know About the TPP, PUBLIC
CITIZEN (July 28, 2016, 4:07 PM), http://citizen.typepad.com/eyeson-
trade/2016/07/six-things-to-know-about-the-tpp.html.
7 Trade, DONALD J. TRUMP, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/trade.
8 See, e.g. David Weigel, Sanders, joined by Rust Belt Democrats, praises Trump
for nixing TPP, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/01/23/sanders-praises-trump-for-nixing-tpp-
delighted-to-work-with-him-on-pro-worker-policies/?utm-term=.a68ffdb 7 ccc9 .
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COOL offers a rare, explicit example of an international trade
body successfully nullifying a U.S. regulation. On May 8, 2015, Pres-
ident Barack Obama told an audience at Nike, Inc.'s headquarters in
Beaverton, Oregon: "No trade agreement is going to force us to change
our laws." But ten days later, the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) held that the laws and regulations requiring
COOL violated U.S. treaty obligations.o On December 7, 2015, a
WTO arbitrator determined that the U.S. violation entitled Canada and
Mexico to pursue billions of dollars in retaliatory tariffs." Just eleven
days after that decision, Congress repealed COOL.1 2 The reason for
repeal, according to the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee,
was to avoid "economically devastating tariffs on a broad spectrum of
U.S. exports, from meat and fruit to jewelry, furniture, and biofuels."l 3
Now, COOL, with the Trump Administration signaling that it
will soon "initiate negotiations related to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its architecture," may be due for a
comeback. 1 4 This article examines the WTO's rationale for disallow-
ing COOL and authorizing over $1 billion in annual retaliatory tariffs.
Over the better part of a decade in the case of U.S.-COOL, the WTO
Appellate Body considered two versions of COOL and determined that
both of them violated treaty obligations of the U.S. Yet the Appellate
Body never made clear what sort of labeling scheme would have sat-
9 Barack Obama, President of the U. S., Remarks by the President on Trade at
Nike, Inc. (May 8, 2015), transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/08/remarks-president-trade.
1o Appellate Body Report, United States - COOL Requirements, WTO Doc.
WT/DS384/AB/RW; WT/DS386/AB/RW (adopted May 18, 2015).
" Decision by the Arbitrator, United States - COOL Requirements, WTO Doc.
WT/DS384/ARB; WT/DS386/ARB (adopted Dec. 7, 2015) [hereinafter "Arbitra-
tor's Retaliation Determination"].
12 See Public Law No: 114-113 (12/18/2015), Sec. 759 (amending the Agricul-
tural Marketing Act of 1946 to repeal country of origin labeling requirements for
beef and pork). Although country-of-origin labeling regulations apply to many other
products, this article uses the acronym "COOL" to refer only to U.S. origin labeling
rules for pork and beef.
1 Michael Conaway, Country of Origin Labeling: All Cost, No Benefit I Com-
mentary, ROLL CALL (May 18, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/coun-
tryof originlabelingallcostno_benefit commentary-241873-1.html_[hereinaf-
ter Conaway Commentary].
14 Draft Letter from Stephen Vaughn, Acting United States Trade Representative
to Congress (published March 29, 2017) available at http://www.usmexicobusi-
ness.com/files/2017/03/20170329150447161.pdf; see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis
and Alan Rappeport. After Calling Nafta 'Worst Trade Deal, 'Trump Appears to Sof-
ten Stance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2017, at A12.
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isfied the test that it laid out. It expressly declined to evaluate alterna-
tives to COOL, and it cited a jumble of deficiencies to support its con-
clusion that COOL was a protectionist ploy. Some of these deficien-
cies, such as COOL's impact on the almost nonexistent livestock trade
between Canada and Mexico, were irrelevant. Other deficiencies, such
as COOL's narrow scope, implied a need for sweeping regulatory
measures that would exceed the costs of the original regulations, par-
ticularly in the case of exemptions for restaurants. As a result, the U.S.
appears to have had little choice but to enact a wholesale repeal of
COOL, or to placate Canada and Mexico outside of the WTO dispute
settlement process.
The Obama Administration shunned negotiations to save
COOL, and its lack of enthusiasm for the regulations might be inter-
preted as a concession that COOL lacked legitimacy as a consumer
protection measure. But a number of factors militate against that con-
clusion. For one, U.S. courts rejected statutory and constitutional chal-
lenges to COOL that were buttressed on largely the same evidence and
arguments that drove the Appellate Body's decisions. COOL also en-
joyed widespread popular support, and resembled similar origin label-
ing rules in other jurisdictions. Even within the U.S., Congress has re-
quired origin labeling on a wide range of goods for over a century.
Finally, trade officials may have worried that negotiating a settlement
to keep COOL in place, despite the results of the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism, would project an image of the U.S. as "above the
law" and undermined efforts to enlist Canada and others in the TPP.
Trump's election rang the death knell for the TPP, but a resur-
rection of COOL is less certain. Early media reports indicated that a
new U.S. Trade Representative might soon propose COOL-related
amendments to NAFTA, in addition to, "measures on currency manip-
ulation, lumber, . . . and environmental and safety standards."' 5 These
signals provoked a strong reaction from big meat processors and re-
tailers, and their allies in Congress.' 6 The backlash may explain why,
in a recent letter to Congress outlining NAFTA renegotiation priorities,
the Administration omitted any mention of origin labeling, and ex-
pressed support for efforts to "eliminate any unjustified TBT
measures."
15 Tal Kopan, Trump transition memo: Trade reform begins Day 1, CNN (Nov.
16, 2016, 8:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/15/politics/donald-trump-trade-
memo-transition/.
16 Jenny Hopkinson, Return of COOL Not Cool at All, POLITICO (Nov. 21, 2016,
10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-agriculture/ 2 016/1 1/return-
of-cool-not-cool-at-all-217512.
" Draft Letter from Stephen Vaughn, supra note 14.
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COOL enjoys widespread popular support, however, and some
of its most ardent supporters are in the rural areas that delivered Trump
the presidency. Since Congress revoked the law, state legislatures in
Colorado, South Dakota, and WXoming have considered bills to rein-
state COOL on certain products. With a NAFTA renegotiation pend-
ing, a new debate on COOL seems timely. This article thus aims to
shed light on arguments that the measure is protectionist, and particu-
larly, that U.S. policymakers should defer to the WTO Appellate
Body's decision.
Part 1 of this article gives a brief overview of the debate sur-
rounding trade liberalization and how the WTO's decision in US-
COOL fits into that larger context. Part 2 offers a description of COOL
and its history, the challenges to the policy before the WTO, and the
various decisions that led to its repeal. Part 3 summarizes the domestic
lawsuit against COOL and argues that it offers an important measure
of comparison to the WTO Appellate Body and panel decisions. The
analysis proceeds in two parts. First, it critically examines the notion
that COOL was a mere protectionist pretense and presents the case for
COOL as a legitimate consumer protection. Second, it critiques the
WTO decisions that led to COOL's repeal. This article concludes that
COOL exemplifies how trade liberalization agreements can undermine
public interest regulation, and that any renegotiation of U.S. trade com-
mitments should seek to accommodate a reinstatement of the law.
II. THE "FREE TRADE" DEBATE
Trade agreements once focused on lowering tariffs, or duties,
on imports. For the past several decades, however, efforts to "free" or
"liberalize" international trade flows have primarily sought to reduce
regulatory barriers to imports and foreign investors. 9 This focus on
regulatory barriers has only increased as the remaining tariffs have di-
minished in size and therefore importance. Today, most trade between
18 Dan Flynn, Wyoming, South Dakota nix country-of-origin-labeling for beef
FOOD SAFETY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2017, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2017/02/wyo-
ming-south-dakota-nix-country-of-origin-labeling-for-beef/#.WN6hwvkrKUk;
HB17-1234, 71st Gen. Assembl., 1st Reg. Sess. (Co. 2017) available at
http://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hbl7-1234.
19 See, Petros Mavroidis & Kamal Saggi, What is not so cool about US COOL
regulations? A critical analysis of the Appellate Body's ruling on US-COOL, in
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF EcONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES,
VUECON-13-00016 (Oct. 03, 2013) ("Following the Kennedy round, every round
(including the on-going Doha round) has mainly focused on disciplining regulatory
barriers: once again, this is only sensible since import and export quotas are illegal,
and tariffs have been gradually reduced to an all-time low.").
256 [Vol. 29:2
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developed countries is subject to duties lower than 5%, and 80% of
exports from developing countries to developed countries' markets are
duty-free. 2 0 U.S. tariffs on live cattle and swine imported from Canada
and Mexico-the commodities principally affected by COOL-are
21
zero.
To the extent that trade agreements succeed in "disciplining"
regulatory barriers, they necessarily constrain domestic policymakers.
Proponents of the WTO and other trade agreements argue that these
constraints are necessary because increased trade results in more jobs,
higher wages, and wealth creation from expanded export opportunities
for American companies, lower costs for consumers, and increased
market competition.22 Proponents further argue that trade deals entice
poorer countries to agree to raise environmental and labor standards
through provisions such as NAFTA's environmental side agreement.
Opposition to trade deals falls into two broad categories: trade
deals fail to create job and wage growth and trade deals undermine
public interest protections. Data such as the exit polls cited earlier sug-
gest that the first claim appears to resonate with many voters. Indeed,
empirical evidence indicates that fewer jobs and stagnant wages in the
U.S. have accompanied increased trade flows.24 However, free trade
proponents tend to respond that automation and productivity gains are
the real culprit for declining employment and wages, and that trade
disrupts the workforce but benefits employment overall.25 They further
maintain that the benefits of cheaper imports more than offset the cost
of the workforce disruptions, and point to broad consensus among eco-
20 WTO, ITC, & UNCTAD, WORLD TARIFF PROFILES 2015 (2015), available at
https://www.wto.org/english/rese/booksp_e/tariff profiles 15_e.pdf.
21 See UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE
OF THE UNITED STATES (2016), (2016), available at https://hts.usitc.gov/view/re-
lease?release=chapter98.
22 See, e.g., Trade Agreements and the WTO, CATO INSTITUTE,
http://www.cato.org/research/trade-agreements-wto (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
23 Howard Chang, The Environment Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership:
An Environmental Agreement within a Trade Agreement, 47 No. 5 A.B.A TRENDS
16, 17 (2016).
24 Harley Shaiken, The Impact of International Free-Trade Agreements on Job
Growth and Prosperity, JOURNALIST'S RESOURCE (Jan. 15, 2015), https://journal-
istsresource.org/studies/economics/business/international-free-trade-agreements-
job-growth-prosperity-impacts.
25 See Scott Lincicome, The Truth about Trade, NATIONAL REVIEW (Apr. 11,
2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/4 3 3 575/trade-jobs-free-trade-hurting-
american-economy:
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nomic scholars that free trade, and NAFTA in particular, have bene-
fited U.S. citizens, at least "on average." 26 For the purposes of this
analysis, it suffices to note that the economic benefits of further trade
liberalization are disputed.
The second line of opposition to trade deals is more relevant to
the COOL debate. It does not focus on the economic costs and benefits
of increased trade so much as the terms of the trade agreements them-
selves, and their impact on public policy. Critics contend that trade
pacts like the WTO and NAFTA have hampered governments' ability
to protect their citizens' interest by enshrining new rights for foreign
investors, and by moving policymaking decisions to less democrati-
cally accountable institutions, where large corporate interests domi-
nate.2 7 This bias towards corporate interests, according to groups like
Public Citizen, undermines the economic benefits touted by free trade
enthusiasts, because it leads to agreement terms that enable anti-com-
petitive practices, such as monopoly protections for pharmaceutical
companies, and that allow corporations to outsource jobs to countries
with lax environmental and labor standards. 28
A. The Trans Pacific Partnership
Concerns that trade agreements primarily serve private, rather
than public interest, motivated much of the opposition to the Trans Pa-
cific Partnership trade pact. The deal, scuttled by the election of Don-
ald Trump, would have encompassed twelve countries and 40% of the
world's GDP.29 After seven-years of closed-door negotiations, the par-
ties made the proposed treaty text available in November of 2015. It
expressly incorporated much of the WTO Agreement on Technical
26 Megan McArdle, 4 Politically Controversial Issues Where All Economists
Agree, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ar-
chive/201 2 /0 4 /4 -politically-controversial-issues-where-all-economists-
agree/255600/.
27 See About Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, PUBLIC CITIZEN (2017),
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=3 147.
28 Ben Beachy, 10 Tall Tales on Trade: Fact-Checking Obama's Top Trade Of-
ficial, PUBLIC CITIZEN: EYES ON TRADE (Jan. 28, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://citi-
zen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/20 15/01/10-tall-tales-about-trade-fact-checking-
obamas-top-trade-official.html.
29 The twelve countries that would have been parties in the TPP were Australia,
Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, United States, Vietnam, Chile, Brunei, Sin-
gapore, and New Zealand. See TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715.
258 [Vol. 29:2
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Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement), including Article 2.1, the pro-
vision that COOL violated. 3 0 Trade unions, environmental groups, and
consumer and heath care organizations quickly signaled their opposi-
tion to the proposed treaty text, arguing that the TPP's terms went far
beyond trade matters and imposed new limits on food, financial, and
other public interest regulations, while giving large corporations un-
precedented rights that would curtail access to medicines, thwart ef-
forts to combat climate change and other environmental ills, and un-
dermine food safety, internet freedom, and consumer privacy, among
other public interests.3 1 Notably, some progressive groups have gone
so far as to claim that popular opposition arising out of these con-
cerns-not Donald Trump's election-was the TPP's true "cause of
death."3 2
Perhaps the most criticized TPP features were what critics
called its "rapid response mechanism" for border inspections and its
proposed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision. The
"rapid response mechanism" refers to language in the proposed agree-
ment's chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which requires
that any sanitary or phytosanitary restriction on imports is "limited to
what is reasonable and necessary, and is rationally related to the avail-
able science." 33 If a country's inspectors find that a shipment of im-
ported goods does not comply with food safety or other standards, the
country must "provide an opportunity for a review of the decision and
consider any relevant information submitted to assist in the review."
TPP proponents argued that these provisions would establish "a mech-
anism for TPP countries to expeditiously resolve unwarranted barriers
that block the export of U.S. food and agricultural products." 35 Critics
pointed out, however, that customs inspectors are already straining to
30 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 8.4, Feb. 4, 2016, available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Technical-Barriers-to-Trade.pdf
[herinafter TPP].
3 Evan Ottenfeld, Six Things to Know About the TPP, PUBLIC CITIZEN: EYES
ON TRADE (July 28, 2016, 4:07 PM), http://citizen.typepad.com/eyeson-
trade/2016/07/six-things-to-know-about-the-tpp.html
32 See, e.g., Evan Greer, Tom Morello & Evangeline Lilly, The TPP wasn 't killed
by Donald Trump-our protests worked, OCCUPY (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.oc-
cupy.com/article/tpp-wasn-t-killed-donald-trump-our-protests-
worked#sthash.gbRWyjcA.dpbs.
3 TPP, art. 7.11, Feb. 4, 2016, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/TPP-Final-Text-Sanitary-and-Phytosanitary-Measures.pdf.
34 Id.
" Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
USTR, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-part-
nership/tpp-chapter-chapter-negotiating-10 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017):
2592017]
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ensure food safety amidst increasing import volumes, and they argued
that allowing exporters to challenge and review border inspections
would create a chilling effect on rigorous enforcement of standards. 3 6
Compared to the TPP's rapid response mechanism, its pro-
posed ISDS provisions were less novel, but they generated more con-
troversy. Unlike the WTO's country-to-country dispute settlement
mechanism (DSM), ISDS allows foreign individuals and foreign com-
panies to sue host-country governments. Private arbitrators, appointed
on a case-by-case basis, adjudicate ISDS claims. The arbitrators make
their decisions based on the treaty's provisions, interpreting ambigu-
ous terms as the need arises. ISDS arbitrators have ordered govern-
ments to pay awards of billions of dollars, and have issued injunctive
relief in some cases, which the host country's courts are often bound
to enforce. 3 7 The United States Trade Representative under President
Obama argued that giving investors the power to challenge govern-
ment actions "allows for an impartial, law-based approach to resolve
conflicts and promotes development, rule of law, and good governance
around the world."3 8 But critics like Senator Elizabeth Warren derided
ISDS panels as "rigged, pseudo-courts," pointing out that the "corpo-
rate lawyers" that serve as arbitrators "go back and forth between rep-
resenting corporations one day and sitting in judgment the next," re-
sulting in a "tilt toward giant corporations" at the expense of public
interest regulations.3 9
36 See Patrick Woodall, The TPP Attack on Commonsense Food Safety Stand-
ards, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.safsf.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/03/FWW-TPP-food-safety-analysis.pdf.
37 See LISE JOHNSON, LISA SACHS & JEFFREY SACHS, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC LAW, COLUM. CTR. ON
SUSTAINABLE INV. (May 19, 2015), (Policy Paper), http://ccsi.colum-
bia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-
Domestic-Law-FINAL-May- 19-8.pdf.
38 TPP: Upgrading and Improving Investor State Dispute Settlement Fact Sheet,
USTR, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-and-Improving-Investor-
State-Dispute-Settlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
3 Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone
should oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-
partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bdle- 11 e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utmterm=.001d2c614fe2. ("The use of ISDS is on the
rise around the globe. From 1959 to 2002, there were fewer than 100 ISDS claims
worldwide. But in 2012 alone, there were 58 cases. Recent cases include a French
company that sued Egypt because Egypt raised its minimum wage, a Swedish com-
pany that sued Germany because Germany decided to phase out nuclear power after
Japan's Fukushima disaster, and a Dutch company that sued the Czech Republic be-
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The grounds for these objections to the TPP are important to
keep in mind because, while the new administration's opposition to the
deal is clear, what it will to do to replace the TPP, or NAFTA for that
matter, largely remains a mystery. 4 0 The new administration has
pledged to negotiate bilateral agreements with TPP signatories in lieu
of the multi-party agreement.4 1 However, those agreements could in-
clude more favorable terms for U.S. industries and nevertheless draw
criticism from TPP opponents if they include provisions like a "rapid
response mechanism" and ISDS arbitration. The new administration
could face similar disenchantment if it renegotiates NAFTA and does
not address COOL, or for that matter, Mexico's challenge under the
DSM to U.S. "dolphin safe" tuna rules.4 2
B. The World Trade Organization
On July 29, 2016, Af hanistan became the 164th member of the
World Trade Organization. A "central pillar" of WTO membership
is submitting to the DSM, over which the WTO Appellate Body has
final say. Unlike the ad hoc appointees that arbitrate ISDS claims, the
seven WTO Appellate Body members serve four-year terms, with a
maximum of two terms allowed. Only countries that are WTO mem-
bers-not individual investors or corporations-may bring complaints
before the Appellate Body, and over the years the WTO has undertaken
reforms to make its dispute settlement process more transparent, more
open to participation by non-governmental organizations and other
stakeholders, and more closely tied to a reasoned body of jurispru-
dence. 4 4 As a result, the WTO Appellate Body has come to represent
cause the Czechs didn't bail out a bank that the company partially owned. U.S. cor-
porations have also gotten in on the action: Philip Morris is trying to use ISDS to
stop Uruguay from implementing new tobacco regulations intended to cut smoking
rates.").
40 See, e.g. Alexander Bolton, Angst in GOP over Trump's trade agenda, THE
HILL (Feb. 20, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/320187-angst-in-gop-over-
trumps-trade-agenda.
41 Id.
42 Summary of Key Findings, US - Tuna II, WTO DS381, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/casese/ds381 e.htm (judgment on
Mexico's request for authorization to retaliate is expected in mid-May).
43 Members and Observers, WTO, available at https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
44 See Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1546-47 (2006). ("The WTO Appellate
Body, in particular, has strengthened the adjudicatory process and broadened the
base of WTO administrative law. It has adopted detailed procedural rules for notices
2612017]
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something of a gold standard of international trade law authority, an
"independent court, which has often decided controversial questions in
balanced or deferential ways." 45
Nevertheless, the WTO Appellate Body has also received its
fair share of criticism. A 2009 analysis showed that complainants won
88.89% of the time in trade-remedy cases before the WTO.4 6 Accord-
ing to the analysis, "case selection, settlement constraints, information
and stake asymmetries, Complainants' desire to make law, and sup-
posed weakness in Respondents' cases" all fail to explain this "asym-
metry" in outcomes. Rather, "the Appellate Body has acted in a man-
ner that consistently reduces Respondents' regulatory discretion," and
in doing so, "produced a jurisprudence that privileges trade liberaliza-
tion at the expense of the reservations members made through the ne-
gotiating process."4 7
This orientation has resulted in the Appellate Body striking
down a wide range of regulations that ostensibly sought to promote the
public interest. Ironically, the Appellate Body has often invalidated
rules because they do not go far enough in promoting their public in-
terest objective. For example, the Appellate Body ruled that a U.S. ban
on clove and other flavored cigarettes was an illegitimate trade barrier
because it did not include a ban on menthol cigarettes. 48 It ruled that
of appeal,. specific methods of submitting timely evidence, measures to avoid con-
flicts of interest for those hearing cases, and has even welcomed amicus briefs, giving
a new avenue for participation in this critical dimension of WTO rulemaking. Alt-
hough the proceedings of the Appellate Body remain confidential, the members of
the Appellate Body have taken the need for explanation of their decisions to heart,
carefully laying out the logic for each decision, highlighting precedents, and building
a base of WTO jurisprudence. The Appellate Body's formalization of its procedures
has helped to build understanding about the rules of international trade, provide a
check on WTO policymaking, and promote real policy dialogue. These changes,
which are part of the broader shift toward a more formal and rules-based institution,
have given the WTO a new foundation of order-based authority as well as enhanced
Madisonian and Habermasian legitimacy. The dispute settlement rules and proce-
dures have provided the organization with a reputation for fairness and rigor in up-
holding due process, and thus greater procedural legitimacy.").
45 Robert Howse, The Forward, 27 EUR. J. INTL. L. 40,46 (2016).
46 Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Anal-
ysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 383, 439 (2009).
47 Id. at 436.
48 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012).
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the European Community could not ban seal products without elimi-
nating exceptions for its indigenous populations. 4 9 It ruled that Brazil
could not impose an import ban on retreaded tires without applying the
ban to its Latin American neighbors with whom it sought to create a
common market.5 0 And it ruled that the U.S. could not certify volun-
tary "dolphin-safe" labeling claims on tuna harvested from the Eastern
Pacific without applying more rigorous standards to producers world-
wide.
Defenders of the WTO, however, argue that these decisions ac-
tually support stricter or more comprehensive regulatory schemes that
better advance the interests behind the regulations.5 2 The European
Union's elimination of certain exemptions for indigenous seal hunting,
and the United States' issuance of new, broader "dolphin-safe" label-
ing rules, arguably bolster this argument.5 3 Other disputes, like the
U.S. ban on clove cigarettes favored by children, resulted in what were
essentially bribes to complaining governments, adding to the costs of
the regulation.54 A WTO ruling may also result in the wholesale repeal
of the regulation in question. This is what happened in the case of
COOL, and unsurprisingly, trade critics have held it up as an example
of "how trade agreements can undermine domestic public interest pol-
icies."ss The following section takes a closer look at this claim.
49 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R /
WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June, 18 2014).
50 Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007).
. ' Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Concerning the Importa-
tion, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R
(adopted June 13, 2012).
52 See Howse, supra note 45, at 44.
Jani Actman, Dolphin-Safe Tuna Rules Just Got Tougher, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 25, 2016), http://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/2016/03/160325-dolphin-safe-tuna-label-mexico-world-trade-organi-
zation/.
54 Rather than ban menthol cigarettes popular among adult smokers, the U.S.
negotiated trade concessions with Indonesia on insulated ignition wiring sets to
maintain its ban on flavored and clove cigarettes preferred by children. Vicki Need-
ham, US, Indonesia Settle Fight Over Clove Cigarettes, THE HILL (Oct. 3, 2014, 5:43
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/219755-us-indonesia-settle-clove-cigarette-
dispute.
ss Symone Sanders & Lori Wallach, WTO Orders U.S. to Gut U.S. Consumer
Country-of- Origin Meat Labeling Policy, Further Complicating Obama Fast Track
Push by Spotlighting How Trade Pacts Can Undermine U.S. Consumer, Environ-
mental Policies, PUBLIC CITIZEN (May 18, 2015), http://www.citizen.org/docu-
ments/press-release-wto-cool-ruling-may- 2 015.pdf.
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III. COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING FOR BEEF AND PORK (COOL) 56
U.S. law has long required many products to indicate country-
of-origin on their labeling, but until 2009, these requirements did not
apply to beef and pork harvested from animals imported into the U.
S. "Retail-ready" imports of beef and pork from abroad had to carry
origin labels (as they still do today in the wake of COOL's repeal), but
livestock slaughtered in the U.S. underwent a "substantial transfor-
mation" that allowed producers to treat it as a domestic product.5 8
Members of Congress cited a variety of reasons for passing COOL,
includin food safety, sustainability, and protecting domestic livestock
farmers. Large meat processors and their retailer clients led the op-
position to COOL, arguing that the benefits to consumers did not jus-
tify the billions of dollars that the industry would have to spend to track
and label the origin of meat.60
When the opponents of COOL could no longer delay the law's
implementation, Canada and Mexico challenged the labeling rules in
the WTO. The WTO Appellate Body held that the rules were an un-
lawful trade barrier, in part because they did not adequately inform
consumers. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) attempted to
comply with the WTO ruling by issuing a new COOL regulation that
gave consumers more information. In response, the American Meat
Institute and other industry groups filed a lawsuit challenging the re-
As noted earlier, this article uses the term "COOL" to refer only to U.S. man-
dato country-of-origin labeling requirements for beef and pork.
See Joel L. Greene, Country-of-Origin Labeling for Foods and the WTO Trade
Dispute on Meat Labeling
Analyst in Agricultural Policy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. at 2, Appx. B (Dec. 8,
2015).
5 Id. at 29-30. Greene notes that while "retail-ready packages of imported meat
products (for example, canned hams or packages of salami) have had to carry [origin]
labeling," when "imported bulk products, such as carcasses," are further processed
in the U.S., USDA authorities consider this "enough of a transformation so that coun-
try markings are no longer necessary." This interpretation of "substantial transfor-
mation" appears to be at odds with that of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, which "generally requires that imports undergo more ex-
tensive changes."
5 107 CONG. REC. H153740 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statements of Bono and
Reps. Thune and Thurman) available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-
2002-04-24/pdf/CREC-2002-04-24-ptl-PgH1537-7.pdf.
60 See, e.g., Peter Chang, Country ofOrigin Labeling: History and Public Choice
Theory, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 693, 700-02 (2009).
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vised rule in the District Court for the District of Columbia. That law-
suit failed, but the WTO Appellate Body ruled that the new COOL
regulation was also an unlawful trade barrier by virtue of its costs to
industry, the value of the information it delivered to consumers, and
the breadth of the market segment that it reached. As a result, the WTO
authorized Canada and Mexico to levy retaliatory tariffs against U.S.
goods. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed an appropriations rider re-
pealing COOL.61
Congress' rapid repeal of COOL in response to the WTO's
judgment was unprecedented. The Obama Administration's support
for repeal, and its refusal to negotiate with Canada and Mexico outside
of the WTO to salvage its labeling rule, suggested that COOL was not
worth saving. But was the rule simply a pretense for protectionism?
The following delves into the details of the COOL controversy and
summarizes the rulings on COOL from the WTO and U.S. courts in an
effort to shed light on that question.
A. A BriefHistory
The COOL regulations invalidated by the WTO were relatively
short-lived, originating in the 2002 Farm Bill 6 2 and finally imple-
mented in 2009 by the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service
(AMS). 63 However, Congress has required country of origin labeling
on some products for over 125 years.64 Many imports fall under the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which requires that "every article
of foreign origin . . . shall be marked . . . as to indicate to an ultimate
purchaser . . . the country of origin of the article." 65 Under Smoot-
61 See Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2016, H.R.2029, 114 Cong. §759 (Dec.
18, 2015) (removing beef, pork, ground beef, and ground pork from the list of prod-
ucts for which country-of-origin labels must be attached).
62 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 134, 533.
63 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 74 Fed. Reg. 2,658 (Jan. 15, 2009).
64 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23-24 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (citing Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 6, 26 Stat. 567, 613); U. S. v. Ury, 106
F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1939); see also Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 304, 46 Stat. 590,
687 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1304); Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939,
amended by Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, §§ 304-05, 98 Stat. 1585, 1604 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
68b(a)(2)(D)); Fur Products Labeling Act 65 Stat. 175, 177-78 (1951) (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. § 69b(2)(F)); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 72 Stat.
1717, 1719 (1958) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 70b(b)(4)-(5)); American Auto-
mobile Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 102-388, § 210, 106 Stat. 1556 (1992) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 32304).
65 Marking of Imported Articles and Containers, 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2006).
2652017]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
Hawley, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has promul-
gated rules requiring country of origin labeling on most goods im-
ported in consumer-ready packages.6 The Bureau does not, however,
require labeling on goods that undergo a "substantial transformation"
67once in the United States. It also invokes a statutory exception to
exempt a large list of over eighty products-from "jute bags" and
"wooden dowels" to "playing cards" and "livestock."
COOL sought to fill in some of the gaps left by Smoot-Hawley.
Domestic cattle and hogs have traditionally dominated the American
market, but the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and 1994
NAFTA ushered in a flood of cheaper beef imports from Canada and
Mexico.68 At the same time, the livestock industry was becoming more
consolidated. In 1991, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a
report pointing out that the meatpacking industry-with just four firms
controlling 70% of the market-was more concentrated than it had
been in 1921, when concern over anticompetitive practices led Con-
gress to pass the Packers and Stockyards Act. 6 9 GAO followed with
another report in 1996 that sharply criticized the Packers and Stock-
yards Administration's failure to collect data on meat prices and to take
other steps towards regulating anticompetitive practices. The report
noted that the four dominant meatpackers' share of the market had in-
creased, as of 1995, to 81%.70 For ranchers and hog farmers that con-
tracted or competed with the large meatpackers, COOL represented a
way to differentiate their product from foreign competitors and a meas-
ure of relief from the price pressure that the large meatpackers could
66 Wendy A. Johnecheck, An Examination of Whether U.S. Country of Origin
Labeling Legislation Plays a Role in Protecting Consumers from Contaminated
Food, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 193 (2010).
67 The Bureau interprets "ultimate purchaser" to be the processor or manufac-
turer that last receives the article in imported form. Definitions, 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(d)
(2009).
See Chang, supra note 60, at 700 (citing USDA import data for the proposition
that cattle imports from Canada remained largely constant from 1978 to 1988, but
then steadily grew from an average 368,000 head per year to 1.5 million head in
1996).
69 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ADMINISTRATION:
OVERSIGHT OF LIVESTOCK MARKET COMPETITIVENESS NEEDS TO BE ENHANCED
(1991), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151157.pdf.
70 U.S GEN. ACCT. OFF., PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS: USDA's
RESPONSE TO STUDIES ON CONCENTRATION IN THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY (1997),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97100.pdf [hereinafter USDA's
RESPONSE].
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impose.
Many early supporters of COOL also believed that Canada and
Mexico were selling livestock below costs, or "dumping," and turned
to COOL after a direct challenge to these practices failed. In particular,
the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Foundation (R-CALF) formed
in 1998 to pursue antidumping and unlawful subsidies complaints
against Canada and Mexico before the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission (ITC).7 2 The ITC ruled against the cattle ranchers' claims in
1999, but R-CALF continued to advocate loudly for COOL. Members
of the much longer established National Cattlemen's Beef Association
(NCBA) voted in 1997 to support COOL for beef products and to con-
vene a task force to draft proposed legislation. However, NCBA
eventually sided with meat processors and packers that opposed a man-
datory labeling program.74
Congress passed COOL in the 2002 Farm Bill. The COOL pro-
visions took the form of an amendment that the House voted to include
in the Farm Bill by a vote of 296-121.75 The amendment provides that
"a retailer of a covered commodity shall inform consumers," of the
commodity's country-of-origin "at the final point of sale." 7 6 The "cov-
ered commodities" include not only beef and pork, but also fish and
any "perishable agriculture commodity." 77 For beef and pork, only an-
imals born, raised, and slaughtered in the United States could be la-
beled as U.S. origin. But while the legislation clearly prohibited retail-
ers from applying a U.S. origin label to meat from livestock that was
not born, raised, and slaughtered within national borders, it did not
specify how the USDA's AMS should handle imported products. For
that, rulemaking was needed.
71 See, e.g. Gilles Stockton, Why Agribusiness Doesn't Support Country of
Origin Labeling, RENSE.COM (Mar. 22, 2003), http://rense.com/general50/whyagri-
business.htm (asserting that the interest of the "meat packing cartel and the rapidly
developing oligopoly in food retailing" in "maintaining control and power over the
cattle industry is an important reason for the strong opposition to COOL.").
72 See Why was R-CALF USA Founded?, R-CALF USA ADMIN. (Apr. 26, 2013,
1:49 AM), http://www.r-calfusa.com/tbfaq/why-was-r-calf-usa-founded/.
73 Bryan Dierlam, Director of Legis. Aff., Nat'l Cattlemen's Beef Ass'n, Animal
Identification & Country of Origin Labeling, Presentation at the University of Flor-
ida (May 5, 2004), available at dairy.ifas.ufl.edu/files/dpc/2004/Dierlam.pdf.
74 See, e.g., Scott George, The Fallacy of COOL, NAT'L CATTLEMEN'S BEEF
Ass'N, https://www.beefisa.org/ourviewscolumns.aspx?NewslD= 29 4 2 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2017).
7 H. Amdt. 351 to H.R. 2646 107th Cong. (2001) (amendment requiring country
of origin labeling of perishable agricultural commodities).
76 id
n 7 U.S.C.A. § 163 (West 2000).
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Many powerful interests had opposed the 2002 COOL legisla-
tion, and the fight did not end once COOL became law. In 2003, COOL
supporters had reason to expect that the AMS might implement the law
relatively quickly. That year, U.S. authorities traced a case of mad cow
disease back to Canada, and the AMS published a proposed rule.7 9 In
2004, however, opponents of COOL, which by then included large cor-
porate interests like Wal-mart, ConAgra, National Pork Producers
Council, Grocery Manufacturers of America, and the American Frozen
Food Institute, succeeded in putting COOL on ice. Representative
Henry Bonilla, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee sub-
committee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and the FDA, intro-
duced a proposal to withhold funding to implement COOL for meat
for one-year.s0 This provision eventually took the form of an appropri-
ations rider that delayed the implementation of mandatory COOL for
all commodities other than fish and shellfish until 2006.81
In 2006, COOL went forward for fish,82 but another appropri-
ations rider once again put the break on all other covered commodities
in 2006 legislation. 3 In the 2008 Farm Bill, however, Congress revis-
ited COOL, driven in part by public angst over imports of melamine-
contaminated pet food from China that contributed to the deaths of
thousands of dogs and cats in America. 84 The 2008 law expanded the
list of covered commodities to include chicken, goat meat, ginseng,
pecans, and macadamia nuts. It also revised the rules for determining
the origin of meat, broadened exemptions for processed foods, accom-
See Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Dairy Cow, CDC (Jan. 9, 2004),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5253a2.htm; Sheryl Gay Stol-
berg, Mad Cow Case Heightens Debate on Food Labeling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004,
at A16. ("The dispute has the potential to derail a $328 billion catchall appropriation
measure the Senate is scheduled to take up.").
7 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Lamb, Pork, Fish, Perishable
Agricultural Commodities, and Peanuts, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,943, 61,944 (Oct. 30,
2003).
so Full country-of-origin labeling funding denied by House Ag Appropriations
Committee, THE FREE LIBRARY: FOOD & DRINK WEEKLY (June 23, 2003),
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Full+country-of-origin+labeling+funding+de-
nied+by+House+Ag...-aO104330729.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 108 Pub. L. 199, § 749 (2004).
82 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Fish and Shellfish, 69 Fed. Reg.
59,708 (Dec. 28, 2004).
8 Pub L. No. 109-197, § 792, 119 Stat. 2142, 2164 (2006).
84 Chang, supra note 60, at 704.
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modated the practice of commingling meat of different origins? re-
duced fines, and eliminated certain recordkeeping requirements. On
August 1, 2008, the AMS published an interim final rule that covered
beef and pork.86
Consumer advocates and other proponents of COOL cheered
the Agency's activity, albeit with some caveats. In particular, some
groups questioned the breadth of the regulation's exemptions for "pro-
cessed food items," which included "cooked, cured, or smoked" prod-
ucts, and operated to exclude approximately 60% of pork products
from labeling, not to mention 95% of peanuts, pecans, and macadamia
nuts. The 2008 rule also allowed producers to employ a "catchall"
label to indicate multiple origins for meat derived exclusively from just
one country or even of U.S. origin. In other words, a producer might
choose to indiscriminately label all of its covered retail products "Prod-
uct of USA, Mexico, Canada."88 The American Meat Institute (AMI)
would later point to on-line polling in support of an equivalent label,
making the case that "consumers value labeling such as 'Product of
North America' approximately the same as 'Product of the United
States."'89 Because virtually all live cattle and hog imports into the
U.S. come from Canada and Mexico, such a label would deprive con-
sumers of much of information offered by COOL's.90 It would, how-
ever, allow consumers to avoid products derived from carcasses or
85 See Panel Report, United States - COOL Requirements, WTO Doc.
WT/DS384/RWT/DS386/R 1, 40 (adopted Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Panel
Report].
86 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat
Meat, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macada-
mia Nuts, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,106 (2008).
87 Comments of Chris Waldrop on behalf of Consumer Fed'n of Am., Docket
No. AMS-LS-07-0081 (Sept. 15, 2008) (on file with the author).
88 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Fish and Shellfish, supra note 82.
8 9 Facts: Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, NORTH AM. MEAT INST. (Jan.,
2015), https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/ 9 2 5 18.
90 See Mavroidis & Saggi, supra note 19 (describing market for cattle and hogs
in the U.S.: "First, in this market, the US exports much less than it imports from its
neighbours: in 2012, US exports of cattle and hogs to Canada and Mexico were only
$48 million whereas its imports were nearly $2.1 billion (over 40 times). Second,
almost all live cattle imports into the US come from its two neighbours: live hog
imports come primarily from Canada while feeder cattle (i.e. cattle placed on feed
lots or pasture prior to slaughter) come mostly from Mexico. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, the market share of domestic meat suppliers is large: since 2000, cattle
imports have accounted for only about 6% of total cattle slaughtered in the US with
the figure for hogs being roughly the same.").
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bulk shipments of meat from countries such as Australia, New Zea-
land, and Brazil. 91
When the Obama Administration came into office, the AMS
issued yet another rule, addressing all covered commodities, including
fish and shellfish, on January 15, 2009.92 In the 2009 rule, the AMS
defined the four categories for "muscle cuts" of meat set out in the
COOL statute. Two of these referred to meat exclusively born, raised,
and slaughtered in either the U.S. (Label A) or abroad (Label D). The
other two categories (Labels B and C) referred to animals born, raised,
and slaughtered in different countries, with an additional distinction
applying to animals imported to the U.S. for "immediate" slaughter,
defined as within two-weeks of importation. 93 A separate labeling
scheme applied to ground beef.
Unlike the 2008 interim final rule, the 2009 rule did not permit
producers to employ a "catchall" label, such as "Product of U.S., Can-
ada or Mexico," regardless of the meat's actual origin. This agency
made this change, according to the rulemaking notice, because it did
not intend "for the majority of product eligible to bear a U.S. origin
declaration to bear a multiple origin designation." 94 The 2009 rule did,
however, allow producers to commingle meat of different origins on a
single production day, in which case they could use a label indicating
multiple ori us. 95 It also retained broad exemptions for "processed
food items.'
Before the 2009 rule went into effect, USDA Secretary Tom
Vilsack issued a letter to "industry representatives." The letter ex-
plained that the Secretary was "suggesting" that "industry voluntarily
adopt" labeling practices beyond those prescribed in the rule, including
information regarding where animals were born, raised, and slaugh-
tered in the case of "product from multiple countries," and labels on
certain processed foods, for which exemptions "may be too broadly
' See Greene, supra note 57; CME: How Much Brazilian Beef Will be Imported
to US as Market Opens?, THE CATTLE SITE, Aug. 3, 2016, http://www.thecattle-
site.com/news/50023/cme-how-much-brazilian-beef-will-be-imported-to-us-with-
market-opening/ (noting volumes of meat products imported from various U.S. trad-
ing partners).
92 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat
Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodi-
ties, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 74 Fed. Reg. 2,658 (Jan. 15,
2009).
9 Id. at 2,661.
94 Id. at 2,659.
95 Id.
9 Id. at 2,662.
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drafted."9 7 A WTO arbitration panel later determined that this letter
was itself a defacto technical regulation that amended the 2009 rule.9 8
B. The WTO Dispute
In December 2008, even before AMS issued its final rule im-
plementing COOL, Canada and Mexico challenged COOL as defined
in the interim final rule in the WTO. The litigation focused on two
provisions of the WTO TBT Agreement. Under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement, a WTO member's technical regulations must give im-
ported products "treatment no less favourable" than that of its domestic
products. Under Article 2.2, a member's technical regulations may not
restrict trade more "than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective." 99
Twice the Appellate Body reviewed COOL's compliance with these
provisions, and twice it ruled that COOL served a "legitimate objec-
tive."i00 However, it did not rule that COOL restricted trade more than
necessary to fulfill that objective. Rather, it concluded that Mexican
and Canadian livestock importers were subject to "less favourable"
treatment under COOL.'01 The Appellate Body thus avoided indicating
what, if any, alternative labeling regime could replace the invalidated
COOL rules. Eventually, a WTO arbitrator authorized Canada and
Mexico to issue over $1 billion in retaliation.102
Although Article 2 of the TBT Agreement played the central
role in the WTO litigation, the complainants entered a laundry list of
claims. In addition to arguing that COOL violated Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement's, Mexico and Canada alleged that COOL violated
Article 111:4 of the predecessor treaty to the WTO - the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Similar to Article 2.1 of the TBT
97 Letter from Thomas Vilsack, USDA Secretary, to Industry Execs. (Feb. 20,
2009) available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/0220_IndustryLetterCOOL.pdf.
98 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85, at 203.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
100 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Certain Country of Origin La-
belling (COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R (adopted June 29,
2012) at 130 [hereinafter 2012 Appellate Body Report]; Appellate Body Report,
United States - Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements, 17,
WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/RW and WT/DS386/AB/RW (adopted May 18, 2015)
[hereinafter 2015 Appellate Body Report].
101 2012 Appellate Body Report supra note 100; 2015 Appellate Body Report
supra note 100.
102 See Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11.
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Agreement, Article 111:4 of GATT requires that members provide im-
ported products "no less favourable treatment ... in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use." 10 3 Canada and Mex-
ico also alleged that COOL violated GATT Article IX:4, which pro-
hibits laws "unreasonably increasing" the cost of imports, and GATT
Article X:3, which requires "uniform, impartial and reasonable" ad-
ministration of regulations affecting imports. 10 4 Finally, the complain-
ants alleged that COOL violated Article 2 of the Agreement on Rules
of Origin, 0 5 which among other things, prohibits countries from using
rules of origin "as instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or
indirectly." 6 The United States would later argue that the very exist-
ence of provisions governing "marks of origin" supported a narrower
interpretation of GATT Article 111:4, but to no avail. 07
1. The 2011 Panel Report
The WTO, in response to Mexico and Canada's complaints,
assembled a panel of three arbitrators. The panel presided over two
2010 hearings, which the parties agreed to make available to the public
by closed-circuit television simultaneously broadcast to a separate
viewing room.' 08 On July 29, 2011, the panel issued a report ruling that
COOL violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and that
Secretary Vilsack's letter suggesting "voluntary action" was an unrea-
sonable administration of COOL in violation of GATT Article
X:3(a).1 09 The panel declined to reach the other claims.110
As mentioned, Canada and Mexico ultimately succeeded in in-
validating COOL based on Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and the
Appellate Body's decisions largely hinge on an analysis of those
claims. Hence, the arguments related to that provision warrant closer
1o3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.
104 See Id.; 2015 Appellate Body Report, supra note 100, at 162-63.
05 Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the WTO,4 U.N.T.S. 1995, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publica-
tion/UNTS/Volume%201867/volume-i 867-1-31874-English.pdf.
106 Agreement on Rules of Origin, Dec. 15, 1993, in Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1143. available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-
roo e.htm.
107 See 2015 Appellate Body Report supra note 100, at 24.
108 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85, at 2.
'
09 Id at 214A.
110 Id
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examination.
Drawing on the WTO's decision in Korea - Various Measures
on Beef, 12 Canada and Mexico argued that COOL violated the "no less
favourable treatment" provision because it gave "domestic products a
competitive advantage," and thus modified "the conditions of compe-
tition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported" cattle and
swine. 11 3 The alleged competitive advantage arose from "incentives
for US industry to use exclusively US-origin animals," and to avoid
the cost of keeping track of which animals came from where.11 4 The
U.S. argued that COOL applied to all beef and pork, regardless of
origin, and was thus facially neutral. Any detrimental effect on im-
ported livestock arose out of "factors or circumstances unrelated to the
foreign origin of the product,""'5 including the relatively small market
share of Canadian and Mexican livestock importers," 6 and the strate-
gic business decisions of private livestock and meat processors.
The panel did not dispute the U.S.'s position that COOL was
facially neutral. It reasoned, however, that it had to consider not only
dejure but also defacto discrimination. In other words, while COOL's
labeling requirements applied equally to foreign and domestic produc-
ers, in practice the regulation worked to disadvantage importers. In
support of this conclusion, the panel emphasized the changes that
meatpackers would have to make to comply with COOL, and noted
that these changes would favor operations that did not process im-
ports.1 17 The panel noted that the earlier interim rule's "catchall" multi-
country Label B provision gave producers significantly more flexibil-
ity than the 2009 Final Rule."'8 By contrast, the panel found that the
2009 Rule "for all practical purposes . . . necessitates segregation of
meat and livestock according to origin."" 9
il. Id. at 111.
112 See Appellate Body Report, In Korea - Various Measures on Beef WTO
Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000) (the Appellate
Body agreed with the Panel's ultimate conclusion that Korea's dual retail system (re-
quiring imported beef to be sold in separate stores) accorded "less favourable" treat-
ment to imported beef than to like domestic beef).
113 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85, at 74.
114 id.
I' Id. at 75.
116 Mavroidis & Saggi, supra note 19 (noting that "only about 6% of total cattle
slaughtered in the US with the figure for hogs being roughly the same.").
'7 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85, at 94 (concluding that "Overall, the least
costly way of complying with the COOL measure is to rely on exclusively domestic
livestock.").
' ld. at 82.
19 Id. at 90.
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The 2009 Rule's comparatively strict prohibition on listing
countries from which a muscle cut of meat did not originate marked an
important distinction for the panel. The panel held that COOL's re-
quirements for ground meat did not violate Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement because the 2009 Rule allowed a processor-whether a
largescale meatpacker or retail grinder-to reference a country-of-
origin on its ground meat label even if the processor had not had
ground meat from that particular country in its inventory for up to 60-
days.120 According to the panel, this 60-day "inventory allowance"
gave processors sufficient flexibility and conformed to pre-existing in-
dustry practices to such an extent that it limited COOL's "additional
costs" and thus did not result in less favorable treatment of importers
"in the context of ground meat."' 2 1
By contrast, the panel viewed the necessary segregation for
muscle cuts as entailing significant costs. The panel cited evidence
such as testimony from USDA's chief economist, Congressional Re-
search Service estimates, a consultant's study commissioned by Can-
ada, and a "backgrounder" from the Food Marketing Institute, all indi-
cating that COOL compliance costs would annually exceed $1 billion
dollars. 12 2 The panel reasoned that that these costs were "distributed
differentially between domestic and like imported livestock, to the det-
riment of the latter,"123 in part because "overall, the least costly way of
complying with the COOL measure is to rely on exclusively domestic
livestock."1 2 4
Taking these steps to minimize the costs of COOL was critical,
according to the panel, because producers could not fully pass on the
costs to consumers. The panel cited USDA studies indicating consum-
ers' "lack of interest in a voluntary COOL regime," and reasoned that
COOL would therefore cut into livestock producers' profits. The
USDA did not claim that foreign livestock suppliers would bear a
larger proportion of these costs, and intuitively, consumer apathy re-
garding origin would seem to be good news for importers. Neverthe-
less, the panel cited "confidential business information" showing "a
considerable COOL discount of USD 40-60 per head for imported live-
stock," which "proves that major processors are passing on at least
120 Id. at 109-11 (evidence that was presented to the panel included testimony
from the USDA's chief economist, Congressional Research Service estimates, a con-
sultant's study that was commissioned by Canada, and a "backgrounder" from the
Food Marketing Institute).
121 Id. at 111.
122 See Id. at 80-90.
123 Id. at 86.
124 Id. at 94.
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some of the additional costs of the COOL measure upstream to suppli-
ers of imported livestock." 1 2 5 The panel also noted processors' intent
to transition to use of "Label A" or "Product of U.S.A." for the major-
ity of their products, citing statements from Tyson, Cargill, JBS, and
Smithfield. Those statements also espoused an intent to avoid commin-
gling domestic and imported livestock. In particular, Smithfield an-
nounced that it would stop purchasing imported hogs altogether.
Of course, the major meatpackers had little incentive to down-
play the costs and impacts of a policy they opposed, and so the panel
also cited cost and financial impact estimates that were generated from
econometric analyses commissioned by Canada and Mexico. The U.S.
criticized these analyses' reliance on proprietary "black box" formulas
and other opaque methodologies. The panel agreed that the lack of
transparency did not allow it to "assess with sufficient certainty"
whether the "exact quantification of the costs of the COOL measure"
were "reliable and precise." 127 Nevertheless, it concluded that the anal-
yses "shed some light on the different types of segregation and com-
pliance costs encountered at different stages of the supply chain," and
one of the studies, which presented a theoretical model of COOL's im-
pacts, established a "prima facie case for a negative and significant
COOL impact."l 2 8 According to the panel, evidence presented from
the U.S. to the contrary, including a USDA econometric study based
on actual data, failed to "rebut" that case.
Accordingly, the panel concluded that COOL, as applied to
muscle cuts of meat, afforded imported livestock "less favourable
treatment." 2 9 Notably, the panel did not attempt to balance COOL's
costs against its value to consumers, or to evaluate whether altering
"the conditions of competition" in the livestock market were nonethe-
less necessary to achieve some legitimate objective. Rather, it ruled
that COOL imposed significant costs on industry, that importers faced
a higher proportion of those costs, and therefore the rule amounted to
"less favourable treatment." 30
125 Id. at 95.
126 Id. at 99 ("Further evidence of the reduction of competitive opportunities for
imported livestock includes
statements by imported livestock suppliers that some plants and companies aie
simply refusing to
process any imported livestock any more.").
127 Id. at 128-29.
128 Id. at 138.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 130, 137-138
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The panel did, however, weigh in on COOL's value to consum-
ers in its analysis of the complainants' claims that COOL violated Ar-
ticle 2.2 of the TBT Agreement which requires that "technical regula-
tions shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a
legitimate objective."1 The panel recognized that "providing con-
sumer information on origin with respect to meat products" was a le-
gitimate objective. However, it concluded that COOL was not neces-
sary because it did not fulfill that objective. 132 The panel reasoned that
the Label B, C, and D schemes were confusing, and they conveyed
insufficient information to consumers regarding origin. The panel
acknowledged that the "Product of the U.S.A." label -Label A-would
manage to "prevent meat derived from animals of non-US origin from
carrying a US-origin label under any circumstances," a problem that
accounted for much of COOL's support, but it deemed that benefit in-
sufficient to justify the regulation's restrictions on trade.1 33 It reasoned
that "merely providing more information than under the previous la-
belling regime or fulfilling only a limited aspect of the identified ob-
jective does not contribute in a meaningful way to fulfilling the objec-
tive."134 In other words, the panel endorsed a "no action" alternative
because doing nothing would equally fulfill COOL's objective of in-
forming consumers.
2. The 2012 Appellate Body Ruling
The United States appealed. On June 29, 2012, the Appellate
Body issued its opinion. While it set aside the Panel's Article 2.2 rul-
ing, it borrowed some of the reasoning from that analysis to uphold the
conclusion that COOL violated Article 2.1. Specifically, the Appellate
Body evaluated the information transmitted to consumers via COOL,
and found it lacking. COOL's benefits to consumers did not warrant
the costs it imposed on industry.
The Appellate Body deemed the Panel's legal analysis under
131 TBT Agreement, supra note 99, at art. 2.2, WTO, Jan. 1, 1995.
132 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85, at 161. The panel noted other examples of
"legitimate objectives" including "national security requirements; the prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or
health, or the environment."
See Letter from Arthur S. Jaeger, Consumer Fed'n of Am., to Sen. Tim John-
son (July 30, 2001) (on file with author) (explaining that a proposal to USDA's Food
Safety Inspection Service for a voluntary "Made in the U.S.A." label would be mis-
leading because "it allows meat from cattle that have been in this country for as few
as 100 days to be labeled 'U.S. Beef."') [hereinafter "Jaeger Letter"].
134 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85, at 176.
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Article 2.1 "incomplete" because it did not determine whether the det-
rimental impact on imports "stems exclusively from a legitimate regu-
latory distinction, or whether the COOL measure lacks even-handed-
ness."1 3 5 This standard was first articulated in the Appellate Body's US
- Clove Cigarettes report, which was issued after the panel issued its
report on COOL. The standard would seem to offer regulations like
COOL more deference, by allowing such rules to modify "conditions
of competition" for importers if the governing authority has a good
reason for doing so. COOL nevertheless failed the test as a result of its
compliance costs, flaws in the way it required retailers to transmit
origin information, and its limited scope of coverage.
The Appellate Body reached its conclusion by first affirming
the panel's finding that COOL subjects importers to a de facto detri-
mental impact because it "creates an incentive for US producers to seg-
regate livestock according to origin, in particular by processing exclu-
sively US-origin livestock."1 3 6 Moving on to whether a "legitimate
regulatory distinction" could account for the measure's impacts on im-
porters, the Appellate Body noted that if "the regulatory distinctions
drawn by the COOL measure are designed or applied in a manner that
constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, those distinctions
cannot be considered 'legitimate'."l37
The Appellate Body decided that COOL failed this "arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination" test on the basis of three factors. First,
COOL required producers to maintain much more information than it
transmitted to consumers. Specifically, meatpackers had to keep rec-
ords on where animals were born, raised, and slaughtered, but retailers
did not have to transmit that information to consumers. Second, COOL
was under-inclusive in its coverage. In particular, it exempted muscle
cuts used as ingredients in processed food items or sold in restaurants
from having to carry origin information, yet producers often did not
know the ultimate destination of meat and thus had to maintain origin
information on these products as well. Third, COOL was confusing.
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that many consumers would
135 2012 Appellate Body Report, supra note 100.
136 In connection with this finding, the Appellate Body dismissed evidence pre-
sented by the United States that showed the price differential between domestic and
imported livestock diminishing during the first nine months of 2010. The panel failed
to acknowledge that evidence in its decision but according to the Appellate Body,
that omission did not rise to the level of reversible error because the 2010 data "re-
flect changes in livestock prices during 2010, after the price effects of the COOL
measure-implemented in March 2009-would already have been felt." Id. at 128,
142-43.
"' Id. at 150.
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struggle to decipher the. meaning of the information presented on
"mixed" labels, such as "Product of United States, Mexico."l 3 8 For
these reasons, the Appellate Body concluded that "the informational
requirements imposed on upstream producers under the COOL meas-
ure are disproportionate as compared to the level of information com-
municated to consumers through the mandatory retail labels."1 3 9
The Appellate Body did not identify an alternative labeling
scheme that it would not consider "arbitrary" or "disproportionate."
Rather, it indicated that the United States had not met the burden of
defending its regulation, noting that "nothing in the Panel's findings or
on the Panel record explains or supplies a rational basis for this dis-
connect" between the "large amount of information" required from
producers and the "small amount of this information [that] is actually
communicated to consumers in an understandable manner."1 4 0
Surprisingly, this analysis did not generate a similar conclusion
that COOL was "more trade-restrictive than necessary." The Appellate
Body agreed with the panel that COOL served a legitimate objective,
and it reversed the panel's ruling that COOL failed to fulfill that ob-
jective because "the Panel's own findings indicate that the COOL
measure did contribute to its objective." 4 ' Yet the Appellate Body
concluded that it could not complete the legal analysis of whether the
complainants' proposed "alternative measures" represented a less
trade-restrictive means of fulfilling COOL's objectives. Those alterna-
tive measures consisted of some combination of making COOL volun-
tary; labeling origin based on where "substantial transformation" took
place, and implementing a comprehensive traceback system.1 42 The
Appellate Body concluded that the panel failed to make sufficient fac-
tual findings to evaluate these alternatives, although in the lead up to
its analysis it repeated the panel's refrain that, if consumers truly val-
ued COOL, then they would be willing to pay for it by supporting vol-
untary program. 4 3
Id. at 153.
139 Id. at 154.
140 id.
141 Id. at 203.
142 For the purposes of its analysis, the Appellate Body appears to have equated
"substantial transformation" with "slaughter." See Id. at 194 (noting "that Canada's
position appears to imply that it would accept the legitimacy of providing consumers
with information on origin when such labelling is based on origin as defined by the
principle of substantial transformation-that is, according to the country in which
the last production step (slaughter) took place.").
143 Id. at 209 ("That most US consumers are not prepared to pay to receive in-
formation on origin as defined in the COOL measure with respect to the meat prod-
ucts they purchase suggests that obtaining such information is not a high priority for
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3. The 2013 COOL Rule
Following the Appellate Body's 2012 ruling, supporters of
COOL rallied around reforms that might bring the rules into compli-
ance with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.1 4 4 In particular, the
USDA could issue a new rule requiring labels to provide information
about where source animals were born, raised, and slaughtered. This
would largely eliminate the "disconnect" between the extent of the
origin information collected from producers and that offered to con-
sumers. Similarly, a revised rule could eliminate labeling exemptions
for certain processed food products.1 4 5 Finally, a revised rule could
prohibit commingling meat from different sources, since the Appellate
Body had agreed that producers employed segregation and the possi-
bility of commingling raised the specter of inaccuracy. The COOL
statute itself exempted food service establishments from having to pass
along origin information to consumers, and so Congress would have to
act to address that aspect of the "disconnect."
The USDA had to hurry to issue a revised rule. At Canada's
request, a WTO arbitrator ruled that the "reasonable period of time"
for implementing the Appellate Body's recommendations and rulings
was just ten months from the date of its report, or by May 23, 2013.
This timeline assumed that the USDA could revise COOL through an
"interim final rule, which enters into force without prior notice and
public comment."1 4 7 Consistent with the order, the USDA issued an
interim final rule revising COOL on May 23, 2013.148 The new rule
such consumers. This in turn seems to indicate that the consequences that may arise
from non-fulfilment of the objective would not be particularly grave.").
144 See Memorandum from Stewart and Stewart to Roger Johnson, Pres., Nat'l
Farmers Union, et al. (Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/docu-
ments/Strengthen-COOL-Memo.pdf (on Options for Coming into Compliance with
WTO Ruling on Country of Origin Labeling (COOL)).
145 Congress would have to amend the law to bring food service establishments
under its purview, but advocates urged USDA to require that vendors selling to res-
taurants provide origin information, which the establishments could then voluntarily
provide.
146 See Report of Arbitration under Art. 21.3(c), United States-Certain Country
of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc., WT/DS384/24,
WT/DS386/23 (adopted Dec. 4, 2012).
147 Id. at ¶ 97.
148 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat
Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodi-
ties, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,367 (May 24,
2013) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60 and 65) [hereinafter "2013 Rule"].
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required muscle cut labels to indicate where the animal was born,
raised, and slaughtered, and it disallowed commingling of muscle cuts
altogether. It did not revisit the exemptions available for processed
foods.
The day after issuing the new rule, the United States reported
to the WTO that it had brought COOL into compliance with its treaty
obligations. Canada disagreed. Less than a month after the USDA is-
sued the new rule, Canada published potential targets for retaliatory
tariffs against the U.S.1 4 9
4. The 2014 Compliance Panel Ruling
Canada and Mexico requested a "Compliance Panel" to dispute
the United States' claim that the new 2013 rule brought COOL into
compliance with the Appellate Body's ruling. That Compliance Panel
issued its report on October 20, 2014.150 It concluded that the new rule
violated Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement because, although it gave
more information to consumers, it also imposed more costs on produc-
ers, allowed for "label inaccuracy," and applied only to a narrow seg-
ment of retailers. The Compliance Panel did not indicate how an alter-
native labeling measure could avoid these deficiencies.1 5 ' It similarly
declined to rule on whether available alternatives to COOL made the
measure "more trade restrictive than necessary" under Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement, because the complainants had not submitted
enough evidence on their proposed alternatives.
The USDA had adopted the changes in the 2013 rule to address
the "disproportion" between COOL's impact on industry and the in-
formation it delivered to consumers. However, the Compliance Panel
reasoned that the 2013 rule actually increased the "detrimental impact"
of COOL on importers because the 'born-raised-slaughter' designa-
tions under the 2013 rule "increases the number of distinct labels," and
"more origins and labels means more segregation."l52 Specifically, the
Panel cited the example of a producer using cattle imported from both
149 Statement by Ministers Fast and Ritz on U.S. Country of Origin Labelling
(June 7, 2013), available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/media-com-
merce/comm/news-communiques/2013/06/07a.aspx?lang=eng.
'5o See Panel Report, United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc, WT/DS384/RW, WT/DSea6/RW (adopted Oct.
20, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Panel Report] (the compliance panel went a step further
in ruling that COOL also violated Art. 111:4 of the GATT 1994, a determination that
the previous panels had declined to reach).
"' See Id. at 205-06.
152 Id. at 56.
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Mexico and Canada, and raised and slaughtered in the United States.
According to the panel, that producer might have taken advantage of
the flexibility under the original COOL regulation to label all of its
muscle cuts "Product of the United States, Canada, and Mexico." In
other words, the producer could have commingled the meat and la-
beled it accordingly.1 53 Notably, the earlier panel and the Appellate
Body both concluded that the commingling exception was all but
meaningless, forcing producers to se egate animals to comply with
COOL's recordkeeping requirement. The Compliance Panel never-
theless found that the new requirement "entails more segregation." 5 5
The Panel added that companies would incur more segregation costs
in handling the seemingly rare globetrotting pig or cow born in Mexico
(or Canada and then raised in Canada (or Mexico), prior to slaughter
in the U.S.
In addition to an increased detrimental impact, the 2013 rule's
more detailed origin information gave rise to new sources of labeling
inaccuracy and consumer confusion. Foremost among these for the
Compliance Panel were livestock imported into the U.S. more than fif-
teen days prior to slaughter. Under the 2013 rule, meat from these an-
imals could be labeled "raised in the United States" and not "raised in"
the importing country, even though imported livestock "commonly
spend between approximately one third and one half of their lives else-
where."' 57 The Compliance Panel thus identified a significant source
of confusion arising from consumers' need to surmise that an animal
"born in" Mexico or Canada may also have spent some non-negligible
amount of time "raised in" that country as well.
Livestock crossing multiple borders also posed the potential for
153 By contrast, under the 2013 rule the producer would have to segregate the
meat and label it either "born and raised in Mexico, raised and slaughtered in the
United States," or "born and raised in Canada, raised and slaughter in the United
States." See 2013 Rule, supra note 148.
154 See 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85, at 96-98; see also 2012 Appellate Body
Report, supra note 100, at 137 ("While the United States argues that extensive com-
mingling is taking place as an alternative to segregation, it points to no evidence that
it submitted to the Panel demonstrating that the COOL measure's recordkeeping and
verification requirements are being complied with by means other than segrega-
tion.").
155 2014 Panel Report, supra note 150, at 65.
156 Id. at 60 ("Another multiple foreign-origin scenario (Scenario B3) might en-
tail Category B muscle cuts
from livestock raised in more than one foreign country in addition to being raised
(and
slaughtered) in the United States.").
"' Id. at 99.
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consumer confusion, according to the Compliance Panel. While the
Panel recognized that animals born, raised, and slaughtered in three
different countries were "unlikely in the United States' actual trade of
livestock," it nevertheless noted that an animal born in Mexico (or
Canada), then raised in Canada (or Mexico), then shipped back to Mex-
ico (or Canada), prior to slaughter in the United States, "would lead to
label inaccuracy." 15 8
The Compliance Panel's objection to the scope of the 2013 rule
was less surprising. The Panel noted that the rule did nothing to make
COOL more broadly applicable and eliminate exemptions for pro-
cessed foods and restaurants, and it echoed the Appellate Body's ear-
lier concerns in observing "that between 57.7% and 66.7% of beef con-
sumed in the United States, and between 83.5% and 84.1% of pork
muscle cuts, will convey no consumer information on origin. . . ."159
The United States pointed out that other countries often included sim-
ilar exemptions in origin labeling requirements, and that eliminating
them, particularly for restaurants, would entail enormous costs. In re-
sponse, the Compliance Panel acknowledged that cost considerations
were permissible but not as "supervening justification for discrimina-
tory measures."
Similar to the Appellate Body in its 2012 ruling, the Compli-
ance Panel dodged the question of whether some alternative labeling
requirement might withstand scrutiny under the TBT Agreement. It re-
jected the claim that COOL was more "more trade restrictive than nec-
essary" under Article 2.2, because COOL "pursues a legitimate objec-
tive and contributes to the fulfilment of this objective to a considerable
but necessarily partial degree."l 6 1 Canada and Mexico, according to
the panel, had failed to show that any of their proposed alternatives,
such as a voluntary labeling scheme, would "make an equivalent con-
tribution to" COOL's "relevant legitimate objective"1 62 of providing
consumers with origin information.
Yet the Compliance Panel did not show particular concern for
narrowly confining its decision to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
Rather, it piggybacked on its earlier detrimental impact analysis to
Id. at 101.
159 Id. at 106.
160 id.
161 Id. at 181.
162 Id. at 139, 181.
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conclude that COOL also violated GATT Article 111:4. The Panel rec-
ognized that this ruling was unnecessary to the outcome of the case,163
but it blazed ahead anyway, concluding that even if a "legitimate reg-
ulatory distinction" could account for COOL's impact on importers,
the law nevertheless violated the U.S.'s treaty obligations by reducing
the "competitive opportunities" for importers. 164 The analysis suggests
that, even if the U.S. had eliminated exemptions for restaurants and
food processors and eliminated all potential sources of confusion to
consumers, COOL still would not have passed muster under this pro-
vision.
5. The 2015 Appellate Body Ruling
On appeal, the Appellate Body largely upheld the Compliance
Panel's findings. It defended the Panel's analysis under Article 2.1,
including its consideration of counterfactual trade scenarios, and it af-
firmed the Panel's conclusion that COOL violated Article III:4 of
GATT. The Appellate Body took issue with some of the Compliance
Panel's analysis under Article 2.2, but declined to weigh in on the pro-
posed alternative measures, reasoning that the Panel had failed to make
the requisite factual findings. As a result, the Appellate Body left un-
clear how the U.S. might bring COOL into compliance.
Much of the Appellate Body's decision recites the findings of
the Compliance Panel's ruling with respect to compliance costs, label-
ing inaccuracies, and the narrow scope of COOL's regulations. The
decision is notable in its response to U.S. arguments that the Compli-
ance Panel based its Article 2.1 decision on "incorrect hypothetical
transactions."' 6 5 The U.S. pointed out that "there is no evidence of
trade in live animals between Canada and Mexico," yet the compliance
panel cited scenarios in which processors would incur added costs to
handle animals of multiple foreign origins. 1 6 6 The Appellate Body con-
ceded that these scenarios were not "representative of actual" practice,
but reasoned that they nevertheless qualified as "scenarios under which
competitive opportunities may arise."' 6 7 In other words, market condi-
tions might change such that transporting live animals thousands of
miles could become a cost-effective way of rearing livestock, and were
161 Id. at 182. ("Therefore, and taking into account the complainants' explicit
request to address their Article 111:4 claims, we shall not exercise judicial econ-
omy.").
164 Id. at 205.
165 2015 Appellate Body Report, supra note 100.
166 Id. at 84.
167 Id. at 86.
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that to happen, the costs of segregating animals to comply with COOL
would impose a detrimental impact on importers. In support of this
argument,.the Appellate Body pointed out that some of the "incorrect
hypotheticals" complained of by the U.S., such as a facility processing
imported cattle from both Mexico and Canada, did reflect actual, albeit
not "common" practices.1 6 8
The United States launched a similar argument with respect to
the Compliance Panel's findings of "labeling inaccuracies." Here, the
Appellate Body reasoned that the Panel properly considered labeling
inaccuracies that would arise in counterfactual hypothetical scenarios,
involving the transport of live animals thousands of miles, because the
Panel acknowledged the unreality of those problems and "discounted
or disregarded" them accordingly.1 6 9 The Appellate Body emphasized
that the Compliance Panel also found a potential for labeling inaccu-
racy related to actual trade practices. In particular, it cited the panel's
analysis of animals born in Canada (or Mexico), raised in Canada (or
Mexico) for up to 68% of their lifespan, and then imported and raised
until slaughter in the U.S. 17 0 In other words, some labels failed to in-
form consumers of whether an animal was partially "raised" in the
country in which it was born.171
The Appellate Body wrapped up its Article 2.1 analysis with a
defense of the Compliance Panel's treatment of COOL exemptions for
restaurant and processed food sales. According to the Appellate Body,
with so many consumers failing to receive origin information, COOL's
compliance costs "impose a disproportionate burden on producers and
processors of livestock that cannot be explained by the need to provide
origin information to consumers."1 72 The Appellate Body report did
not indicate of what proportion of consumers a label requirement
would have to reach in order to demonstrate this "need to provide
origin information.",' 7 3
Moving on to Article 2.2, the Appellate Body overruled the
Compliance Panel's finding that the complainants failed to make a
Id. (according to the Appellate Body, this scenario supported the Compliance
Panel's finding that the 2013 rule increased recordkeeping burdens because it elimi-
nated the option under the earlier rule to commingle this meat and label it all "Product
of USA, Canada, Mexico." Again, this was the very option that the Appellate Body
dismissed for the purposes of assessing compliance costs in its prior ruling).
169 Id. at 96.
170 Id.
17 Presumably adding this distinction to labeling would entail even more record-
keeping and thus "detrimental impact" to importers but the Appellate Body did not
address that eventuality.
172 2015 Appellate Body Report, supra note 100, at 107.
173 id
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prima facie case that COOL is "more trade-restrictive than necessary."
However, it stopped short of finding an Article 2.2 violation. Rather,
it noted a lack of evidence and highlighted the questions that the Com-
pliance Panel should have answered to determine whether to invalidate
COOL on this ground.
Finally, the Appellate Body upheld the Compliance Panel's
analysis under Article 111:4 of GATT 1994. The United States pointed
out that another provision of the GATT, Article IX, expressly contem-
plates requirements governing "marks of origin," and asked that the
Appellate Body interpret Article 111:4 in light of that provision. The
Appellate Body took note of the provision but reasoned that it "calls
for a reduction of difficulties and inconveniences that laws and regu-
lations relating to marks of origin may cause to exporters," and thus
could not support "a more flexible interpretation of 'treatment no less5,174 afrfavourable' in Article 111:4. It thus affirmed the Compliance
Panel's conclusion: because COOL reduces the "competitive opportu-
nities" for importers, it violates Article 111:4, even if that reduction
"stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction."' 7 5
6. Retaliation
Having lost on the merits, the United States proceeded to the
last stage of the WTO dispute settlement process: setting the retaliatory
tariffs that Canada and Mexico could impose on U.S. exports. Alt-
hough the details may vary, the most common form of retaliation im-
poses "prohibitively high tariffs" on a set of goods chosen by the com-
plainant. Those goods' value must equal that of the imports that are
excluded as a result of the WTO-inconsistent measure. Notably, these
tariffs may apply to all manner of goods unrelated to the beef and pork
products at issue in the dispute, and typically, the complainant country
chooses products "with a view to havin the largest negative political
impact on the respondent government." For example, a complainant
might target goods made in the districts of key congressional lead-
177
ers.
174 Id. at 164.
175 Id.
176 See Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement, I
WORLD TRADE REv. 130 (2002), available at https://digital.library.ade-
laide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/2287/1/Anderson_2287.pdf.
177 Members of Congress cited the threat of these tariffs well before the WTO
dispute settlement process concluded. See, e.g. Laurel Maloy, COOL - WTO and
U.S. Court of Appeals Will Decide its Fate, FOOD ONLINE (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.foodonline.com/doc/cool-wto-and-u-s-court-of-appeals-will-decide-its-
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On June 4, 2015, Canada sought authorization to "suspend con-
cessions" on U.S. exports to an annual value of CAD 3.068 billion, or
roughly $2.45 billion. Mexico followed with a similar authorization
request for $713 million.' 7 8 Both countries claimed that direct export
revenue losses accounted for around two thirds of the claimed dam-
ages, and losses tied to domestic price suppression accounted for the
rest. They calculated these figures by comparing the status quo with a
hypothetical scenario in which the U.S. had repealed COOL.1 79 The
U.S. disputed whether domestic price suppression provided grounds
for relief, and claimed that a more appropriate, alternative methodol-
ogy for estimating export revenue losses indicated just $43.22 million
in damages for Canada and $47.55 million for Mexico.so
How the litigants arrived at such divergent estimates defies
simple explanation. As one COOL advocate pointed out, the overall
value of 2014 live cattle imports to the U.S. was just $1.753 billion for
Canada, an historic high, and $739 million for Mexico. 18 1 By compar-
ison, Canada claimed that its export revenue losses for cattle, as a result
of COOL, amounted to nearly a billion dollars. 1 82 Mexico estimated its
export revenue losses for cattle at $514 million.1 8 3 Canada and Mexico
therefore argued that, without COOL, their national cattle export in-
dustries would have nearly doubled.
For its part, the United States challenged the econometric mod-
els that Canada and Mexico used to arrive at their loss estimates. The
U.S. argued that the models failed to control for independent variables
fate-0001 (reporting that "112 members of Congress have signed a letter to Tom
Vilsack, Agriculture Secretary [that] asks, that in the event the WTO finds COOL
non-compliant, that Congress be prepared to act.").
178 See Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11, at 10-11; June 4,
2015 Exchange Rates, EXCHANGE-RATES.ORG, http://www.exchange-
rates.org/Rate/USD/CAD/6-4-2015 (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
179 Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11, at 19-20 (the U.S. ac-
cepted this choice of counterfactual, although it "point[ed] out that there could be
other options for compliance").
'Id. (the U.S. challenged the inclusion "domestic price suppression" as a factor
in calculating the damages).
181 R-CalfStatement on WTO COOL Ruling, R-CALF (Dec. 7, 2015, 10:56 AM),
http://www.r-calfusa.com/r-calf-usa-statement-on-wto-cool-ruling-2/.
182 See Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11, at 18 n. 63 ("The
breakdown of claimed losses per category of livestock is as follows: CAD 760.9
million for fed cattle; CAD 508 million for feeder cattle; CAD 479.3 million for fed
hogs; and CAD 296.8 million for feeder pigs." The combined cattle value was
roughly $942 million based on the historic exchange rate.).
83 Id. at 18.
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including "economic fluctuations and recession; long-term unemploy-
ment; increased feed costs; shifts in Canadian and Mexican livestock
and meat processing; shifting transportation costs; weather patterns
and drought; impacts of animal disease such as bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy (BSE) in the Canadian herd; and increased demand for
meat during US holidays."l 8 4
On December 7, 2015, the arbitrator issued his opinion. He
agreed that the price estimates should adjust for transportation costs,
but otherwise largely accepted Canada and Mexico's methodological
approach.18 5 The arbitrator authorized Canada to annually impose
CAD 1,054.729 million (-$780 million) 18 6 in tariffs on U.S. goods,
and an amount of $227 million for Mexico. 1 8 7
7. Congress' COOL repeal
Congress took little time to act in response to the WTO's au-
thorization ruling. Less than two-weeks later, a provision repealing
COOL for beef and pork passed in a 2,000 page, $1.1 trillion omnibus
spending bill. In an era characterized by gridlock, the repeal of COOL
marked the fastest response ever by Congress to a WTO ruling.
IV. THE U.S. COURT CHALLENGE TO COOL: AMERICAN MEAT
INSTITUTE V. USDA
While the WTO adjudicated Canada and Mexico's treaty vio-
lation claims, a parallel challenge to the 2013 revised COOL regulation
took place in the U.S. court system. A comparison of the U.S. courts'
and WTO's judgments is instructive despite the differences in the legal
standards they apply.
To be sure, the U.S. courts addressed COOL's legality under
the U.S. Constitution and U.S. statutes, rather than under trade agree-
ment provisions. Nevertheless, the U.S. courts' and Appellate Body's
analyses hinge on similar factors, in particular COOL's costs to indus-
try and its value to consumers. To the extent that these analyses con-
flict, questions of the judgments' legitimacy arise and deserve exami-
nation. Comparing determinations made in the evaluation of claims
184 Id. at 42.
185 See Id. at 45, 67.
186 See Dec. 7, 2015 Exchange Rates, EXCHANGE-RATES.ORG, http://www.ex-
change-rates.org/Rate/USD/CAD/12-7-2015 (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
187 Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11, at 80.
188 See Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Why and
When the United States Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT'L L. 201 (2014).
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under different legal standards is well-established under U.S. law. Un-
der the doctrine of issue preclusion, for example, a determination of an
issue of fact or law essential to the judgment on one claim may control
subsequent actions related to different claims.' 89 Here, U.S. courts' de-
terminations regarding the costs and benefits associated with COOL
were essential to those courts' rulings, and they are largely at odds with
those made by the WTO Appellate Body. This discrepancy should fac-
tor into the assessment of U.S. policy on COOL, as well as of the
WTO's role in regulating U.S. policy.
The U.S. litigation on COOL began when representatives of
American, Canadian, and Mexican meat processors filed their com-
plaint against the USDA in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia on July 8, 2013, less than two months after the Agency is-
sued its new COOL regulation.1 90 The plaintiffs in American Meat In-
stitute v. USDA requested a preliminary injunction of the rule, arguing
that it violated the First Amendment, that the USDA exceeded its au-
thority under the COOL statute, and that the rule was arbitrary and ca-
pricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 191
The District Court, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit, and the
D.C. Circuit sitting en banc, all rejected these challenges in their en-
tirety.
Procedurally, the AM! plaintiffs faced an uphill battle. In order
to show that a preliminary injunction should issue, they had to show
not only a likelihood of success on their claims, but also that the bal-
ance of the equities and the public interest favored an injunction, and
that irreparable harm would result without one. The District Court
deemed all of AMI's claims unlikely to succeed on the merits. It rea-
soned that because COOL required "purely factual and uncontroversial
disclosures," and was "intended to address the possibility of consumer
confusion regarding the origin of covered commodities," it met the re-
quirements for compelling commercial speech under the First Amend-
ment.192 The court went on to reject claims that the USDA exceeded
its statutory authority by requiring retailers to specify where an animal
189 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980)).
190 The original complaint lists as plaintiffs American Meat Institute, American
Association of Meat Processors, Canadian Cattlemen's Association, Canadian Pork
Council, Confederacion Nacional De Organizaciones Ganaderas, National Cattle-
men's Beef Association, National Pork Producers Council, North American Meat
Association, and Southwest Meat Association. Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief at 1, Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 968 F.Supp.2d 38 (2013)
(No. 1:13CV01033).
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 968 F.Supp.2d 38 (2013).
192 Id. at 50-51.
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was "born, raised, and slaughtered," and by banning commingling
practices. According to the court, the statute gave USDA discretion to
require the "born, raised, slaughtered" labeling designations, and "the
record clearly establishes that there was no other way for the agency
to implement a production-step labeling scheme without banning com-
mingling."l 9 3 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' APA claims,
which challenged COOL's ability to provide more accurate infor-
mation to consumers and the USDA's decision not to delay the effec-
tive date of the regulation until after the WTO had reviewed the regu-
lation. As the court explained, because the rule demonstrated. a
"rational connection" to its aims of better informing consumers and
complying with the WTO ruling, it satisfied the APA.1 9 4
Because AMI sought a preliminary injunction, the District
Court went on to consider whether plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
harm. in the absence of an injunction. In finding that the plaintiffs' al-
leged harms did not warrant an injunction, the court noted that the al-
leged harm "does not flow directly from the requirements of the Final
Rule but is instead based on independent market variables such as how
the supplier's customers and/or retail consumers might react."l 95 The
court explained that this sort of indirect harm could not support a pre-
liminary injunction. The court concluded by noting that the U.S. inter-
est in complying with the WTO ruling, and the public interest in
achieving Congress' goal of providing more country-of-origin infor-
mation to consumers, further undermined AMI's case.
A unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed. In upholding
COOL, Judge Williams rejected AMI's contention that COOL "merely
satisfies consumers' curiosity."' 9 6 Rather, the court observed that
COOL "enables a consumer to apply patriotic or protectionist criteria
in the choice of meat. And it enables one who believes that United
States practices and regulation are better at assuring food safety than
those of other countries, or indeed the reverse, to act on that prem-
ise."' 9 7 These objectives justified the intrusion on AMI's First Amend-
ment rights.
A final ruling from the D.C. Circuit, rehearing en banc, more
thoroughly addressed the legitimacy of COOL's objectives. Respond-
ing to AMI's assertion that no more than "idle curiosity" motivated the
regulatory scheme, the majority cited:
19 Id. at 66.
194 Id. at 70.
Id. at 80-81.
6 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
19 Id.
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"[T]he context and long history of country-of-origin disclo-
sures to enable consumers to choose American-made products; the
demonstrated consumer interest in extending country-of-origin label-
ing to food products; and the individual health concerns and market
impacts that can arise in the event of a food-borne illness outbreak."l 9 8
The majority noted that country-of-origin labeling require-
ments dated back to 1890, "an historical pedigree that lifts it well above
'idle curiosity."'l 9 9 For the majority, COOL's legislative history
demonstrated that it served food safety interests. The majority disre-
garded the USDA's refusal to characterize COOL as a food safety
measure, reasoning that to do otherwise "would allow the executive to
torpedo otherwise valid legislation simply by failing to cite to the court
the interests on which Congress relied."2 00
Two judges dissented. For Judge Brown, the government's re-
fusal to invoke "health and safety and domestic protectionism" objec-
tives rendered the regulation indefensible. 2 0 1 As she explained, "the
government's only asserted interest for the rule throughout this litiga-
tion ... has been a consistently vague one: 'The government's interest
is in providing consumers with information that those consumers can
use to make choices about the food that they will ... purchase and serve
to their families or eat themselves."' 202 Without an explanation from
the government of why this was a valid interest, the dissent concluded
that "this is a case about seeking competitive advantage," and that
COOL was an impermissible imposition on plaintiffs' First Amend-
ment speech rights.20 3
V. ANALYSIS
The story of COOL deserves attention for at least three. First,
new trade agreements-if not multilateral ones like the TPP, then bi-
lateral trade agreements with the U.S.-will likely incorporate the
TBT Agreement and potentially expand the application of its "key
principles and disciplines," 204 yet COOL illustrates how application of
1 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
19 9 1d20 01 d. at 25.
201 Id. at 38 (Brown, J. dissenting).
202 Id. at 47 (citing oral argument transcript at 41).
203 Id
204 Non-Tariff Barriers and Regulatory Issues, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP.,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/transatlantic-trade-and-in-
vestment-partnership-t-tip/t-tip-2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2017) ("We seek to build on
key principles and disciplines of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
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those principles and disciplines can conflict with consumer protection
objectives. The divergent outcome of the U.S. courts' adjudication of
COOL brings this conflict into relief, calling into question the eviden-
tiary basis of the Appellate Body's COOL decision, if not necessarily
the logic of its legal reasoning. Second, the story of COOL also demon-
strates the influence that international arbitration tribunals like the Ap-
pellate Body exercise over American policymakers, and their corrosive
effect on democratic accountability. Finally, COOL provides an im-
portant indicator of the Trump Administration's priorities for trade re-
form-do these priorities reflect those of large meat processing corpo-
rations or "popular" interests, such as those of independent livestock
producers? A renegotiation of NAFTA that makes no room for COOL,
even on a voluntary basis, would seem at odds with President Trump's
campaign rhetoric.
Were the new Administration to negotiate concessions with
Mexico and Canada to allow for COOL, Congress would still have to
pass new authorizing legislation to restore mandatory labeling rules for
beef and pork. But even if a new COOL law never came to pass, the
possibility of such legislation could contribute to a productive dialogue
about the values of American consumers. Members of Congress would
no longer be able to scapegoat the WTO and the threat of sanctions as
the reason for opposing the labeling rules. Rather, the debate would
focus on the legitimacy of COOL as a public interest regulation.
To the extent that COOL resembles a protectionist pretext that
fails a "smell test," 2 0 5 the WTO Appellate Body's formal rationale for
finding the measure incompliant arguably carries less significance, and
the case for leaving COOL's repeal undisturbed is stronger. This anal-
ysis thus begins with a defense of COOL as a valid policy tool. It goes
on to consider the Appellate Body's decision, how it compares with
the U.S. courts' treatment of COOL, and the confusion resulting from
the Appellate Body's reliance on factor tests and unwillingness to pass
judgment on the proposed alternatives.
A. Legitimate Labeling Requirements or Protectionist Pretense?
(TBT) through strong cross-cutting disciplines and, as appropriate, through sectoral
approaches, to achieve meaningful market access, and establish ongoing mechanisms
for improved dialogue and cooperation on TBT issues.").
2o See Benn McGrady & Alexandra Jones, Tobacco Control and Beyond: The
Broader Implications of United States-Clove Cigarettes for Non-Communicable Dis-
eases, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 265, 289 (2013); see also Robert E. Hudec, GA TT/WTO
Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32
INT'L L. 619 (1998).
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COOL's opponents have dismissed it as a pretense for deliver-
ing a windfall to a small but politically effective group of cattle ranch-
ers.206 Groups like the American Meat Institute claim that the costs of
the regulation dwarf the benefits. 207 They argue that polling overstates
how much consumers value knowing the origin of beef and pork, and
point to studies of consumer willingness-to-pay for products with and
without origin labels as evidence that COOL fixes a problem that does
not exist.2 According to these critics, COOL unnecessarily intrudes
on long-established voluntary industry practices that adequately met
consumer demand for origin information about beef and pork prod-
ucts.209 But a closer examination of these claims suggest that COOL's
costs were overstated, its benefits undervalued or ignored, and its his-
toric pedigree dismissed. COOL may have conflicted with interna-
tional treaty law, but it was a bona fide consumer protection.
As noted earlier, the legislation authorizing COOL grew in part
out of cattle ranchers' frustration at alleged dumping by Canada and
Mexico,210 and critics insisted that these domestic business interests,
rather than consumers, were the only ones that would benefit from
COOL's "shamefully protectionist boondoggle." 211 Attributing COOL
to protectionism oversimplifies the story, however. Consumer and
public interest groups also supported mandatory labeling. For example,
in 2001, Consumer Federation of America (CFA) wrote in support of
an early COOL proposal, noting that "without country-of-origin label-
ing, [] consumers are unable to make an informed choice between U.S.
and imported products." 212 CFA's letter points out that the "USDA
inspected" label on imported meat likely misleads some consumers,
and it criticizes an alternative industry proposal for a voluntary "Made
206 See, e.g., K. William Watson, Consumers Win as WTO Condemns Protec-
tionist Meat Labels, CATO INST. (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.cato.org/publica-
tions/commentary/consumers-win-wto-condemns-protectionist-meat-labels; see
also North American Meat Institute President and CEO Barry Carpenter Tells Sen-
ators Mandatory Country-Of-Origin Labeling Must Be Repealed, NAMI (June 25,
2015), https://www.meatinstitute.org/ht/display/ReleaseDetails/i/113565 (asserting
"The law has never been about distinguishing meat products in the market, it is
simply a protectionist measure intended to exclude Canadian and Mexican livestock
from the U.S. market. It is and always has been a non-tariff trade barrier. Anyone
ignoring this fact is not a serious participant in this discussion.").
207 Fact Sheet: Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, NAMI (Jan., 2015),
https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht-a/GetDocumentAction/i/92518.
208 id
209 Id.
210 See Why was R-CALF USA Founded?, supra note 72, and accompanying text.
211 Watson, supra note 206.
212 Jaeger Letter supra note 133.
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in the USA" label on beef, both because it would employ loose stand-
ards-beef from cattle spending as little as 100 days in the U.S. could
be labeled "U.S. Beef'-and because the "industry already has volun-
tary labeling authority and it has not resulted in country-of-origin la-
beling for beef." 2 13 Other public interest advocates similarly expressed
support for COOL as a common sense approach to structuring the food
distribution system in a way that would allow consumers to make more
informed choices, increase confidence in the food supply, and bolster
food safety.214
COOL also enjoyed widespread popular support that wavered
little over the years. In 1999, before it turned against the bill, the Na-
tional Cattlemen's Beef Association commissioned a survey finding
78% of respondents in favor of origin labeling for meat products.215 A
2002 industry poll indicated that fully 86% of consumers favored
country of origin labeling.216 And after COOL's passage, no less than
eight surveys showed similar results, with the latest of these in 2013
showing 87% of respondents as agreeing that "food sellers should be
required to indicate on the package label the country or countries in
which animals were born, raised and processed." 2 17
COOL opponents argued that survey respondents are typically
in favor of more information on a consumer product, and that the more
relevant inquiry is how consumers act in the marketplace.218 Yet con-
sumers' behavior and preferences are dynamic and highly responsive
213 Id.
214 See, e.g., Cool Tool: Don't be fooled by country of origin labeling (COOL),
CONSUMERSUNION (Mar. 12, 2009), http://consumersunion.org/research/cool-tool-
dont-be-fooled-by-country-of-origin-labeling-cool/.
215 Country-of-Origin Labeling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Livestock and
Horticulture of the H. Comm. on Agric., 106th Cong. 11 (Apr. 28, 1999) (statement
of Rep. Chenowith, Member, H. Comm. on Agric.), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ag/hag 10615.000/hag 10615_0f.htm.
216 See Tabled Labels: Consumers Eat Blind While Congress Feasts on Cam-
paign Cash, PUB. CITIZEN: CRITICAL MASS ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM
33 n.2 (Sept., 2005), https://www.citizen.org/documents/COOL.pdf (citing Fresh
Trends 2002, THE PACKER (2002), http://nfu.org/documents/legisla-
tive/cool/fresh trends_survey 2002.pdf).
217 Chris Waldrop, Large Majority of Americans Strongly Support Requiring
More Information on Origin ofFresh Meat, CONSUMER FED. OF AM. (May 15, 2013),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA-COOL-poll-press-release-May- 2 013.pdf.
218 For example, NAMI has pointed to evidence that consumers showed similar
support for a "Product of North America" label in online surveys. See Fact Sheet:
Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, supra note 207 (citing on-line surveys as
indicating that "consumers value labeling such as 'Product of North America' ap-
proximately the same as 'Product of the United States."'); see also Country of Origin
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to seemingly inconsequential situational details, 2 19 not to mention, say,
new information on an outbreak of foodborne illness. 2 2 0 Critics of
COOL maintained that "voluntary labeling by country-of-oriin would
have occurred if it were economically beneficial to do so."22 Even as-
suming this were true, however, it does not imply that survey respond-
ents were "wrong" to support COOL. After all, a person may support
policies that are likely to change her behavior in the market, in part by
spreading out the costs of an undersupplied good or service.
Putting aside these objections, the argument that COOL was
not "economically beneficial" exhibits weaknesses on its own terms.
As a preliminary matter, there is reason to question whether consumer
apathy alone accounted for the absence of voluntary origin labeling in
the beef and pork market. In particular, the handful of companies that
dominate the pork and beef processing markets may see greater value
in fostering a less discerning consumer. Certainly, the evidence of
COOL's costs and benefits does not rule out that possibility.
The case for COOL's costs, particularly to importers, rests on
a number of problematic assumptions. Following passage of the 2002
COOL legislation, the USDA huddled with industry officials to gener-
ate an eye-popping $1.9 billion cost estimate for implementing the222law. COOL proponents were quick to point out flaws. As explained
in another letter from Consumer Federation of America, the estimates
assumed "that all U.S. producers, processors and retailers would incur
higher costs under country-of-origin labeling and that no records are
Labeling, JAYSON LuSK: BLOG (Oct. 23, 2014), http://jay-
sonlusk.com/blog/2014/10/23/country-of-origin-labeling.
219 See generally DANIAL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, (Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2011).
220 See, e.g. Huifang Zhang, Thomas L. Marsh, & Jill J. McCluskey, A General-
ized Event Analysis of the 2006 E. coli
Outbreak in Spinach and Lettuce, WASH. ST. UNIV.: IMPACT PROGRAM (2010),
http://www.impact.wsu.edu/MarshFiles/E.coli_paper_V l.pdf (estimating that a
2006 outbreak of E.Coli in spinach resulted in over $400 million in lost sales across
the leafy greens industry).
22 Glynn T. Tonsor, Jayson L. Lusk, Ted C. Schroeder, & Mykel R. Taylor,
Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling: Consumer Demand Impact, KAN. ST. DEPT.
OF AG. ECON., AM-GTT-2012.6 (Nov., 2012), available at http://www.ag-
manager.info/sites/default/files/Tonsor KSU FactSheet MCOOL_1 1-13-12.pdf.
222 See Establishment of Guidelines for the Interim Voluntary Country of Origin
Labeling of Beef, Lamb, Pork, Fish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, and Pea-
nuts Under the Authority of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946," 67 Fed. Reg.
63367 (Oct. 11, 2002).
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currently kept that verify the country-of-origin of the covered prod-
ucts."22 Yet customs laws and USDA meat grading regulations al-
ready required origin information on meat imports, and many produc-
ers not supplying the retail market would not need to incur any
compliance costs. A study published by researchers at the University
of Florida's International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center
(IATPC) questioned the basis for the USDA's assumptions regarding
the number of firms affected, the extent of the impact in light of exist-
ing record-keeping requirements, the extent of the labor hours associ-
ated with maintaining COOL records, and the cost of labor associated
with the increased burden. They concluded that "the cost of record
keeping relating to the labeling legislation is between $69.86 million
and $193.43 million, which is 90 to 95% less than the USDA cost es-
timate."224
On the other side of the ledger, the USDA reported to Congress
in 2015 that it had "found little evidence that consumers would be
likely to increase their purchases of food items bearing U.S.-origin la-
bels."2 25 Yet researchers in 2003 conducted an auction and gathered
other experimental data to estimate that consumers "were willing to
pay an 11% to 24% premium for steak and hamburger, respectively,
that is labeled as to country of origin." 226 Another group of researchers,
frequently cited by the USDA and meatpacking industry for their find-
ings that consumer demand for beef and pork did not increase as a re-
sult of COOL, went even further, giving supermarket shoppers cash to
either keep or spend on access to origin information for a free steak or
pork chop. They acknowledged that this "direct valuation" methodol-
ogy indicated "a large aggregate benefit measure" equal to "$1.5 bil-
lion," which far exceeded the industry's claimed $1.1 billion in
costs. 227
223 See, e.g. Jaeger Letter, supra note 133.
224 John VanSickle, Roger McEowen, C. Robert Taylor, Neil E. Harl, & John
Connor, Country of Origin Labeling: A Legal and Economic Analysis, UNIV. OF FL.:
INT'L AG. TRADE AND POL'Y CTR. (May, 2003), available at
http://www.iatp.org/files/CountryofOriginLabeling_A_Le-
gal and Economi.pdf.
225 OFF. OF CHIEF ECON., USDA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
LABELING (COOL) (2015), available at http://www.agweb.com/as-
sets/i /6/usda cool economic report_2015.pdf.
226 Wendy J. Umberger, Dillon M. Feuz, Chris R. Calkins, & Bethany M. Sitz,
Country of Origin Labeling ofBeefProducts: U.S. Consumers'Perceptions, 34 J. OF
FOOD DIST. RES. 3 (2003), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bit-
stream/27050/1/34030103.pdf.
227 Jayson L. Lusk, Tyler J. Klain, Ted C. Schroeder, & Glynn T. Tonsor, Valu-
ing Information: The Case of Country of Origin Labeling, TOULOUSE SCH. OF ECON:
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All of this is to say that the projected economic costs and ben-
efits of COOL hardly condemn the ruling. Going beyond the narrow
metrics of economic efficiency, the impact of COOL on consumer
awareness, its potential food safety benefits, and its "historical pedi-
gree" further weigh against dismissing it as mere protectionism.
The AMI and its co-plaintiffs argued that COOL served no
more than "idle curiosity," but this trivializes the role of consumer
awareness in the food system. COOL does not guarantee a "local"
product, but it allows a consumer to take a step in the direction towards
making more informed, deliberate choices regarding where her food is
sourced. 2 2 8 A more informed consumer produces what economists re-
fer to as "positive externalities" by helping to drive out inferior prod-
ucts from the marketplace. 2 2 9 Disclosures like those required under
COOL do not just provide information to consumers, they create a
norm that product information should be available, and that consumers
should take note of it and use it to make purchasing decisions.2 3 0 Con-
versely, lack of information in a market will favor low cost producers
that may hawk lower quality or less desirable goods, or rely on pro-
duction practices that many consumers would disfavor if they knew
QUALITY LABELS IN AGROFOOD INDUSTRY, (Dec., 2011) (Fr.), available at
https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/valuing-information-case-country-origin-label-
ing.
228 See Jason J. Czarnezki & Katherine Fiedler, The Neoliberal Turn in Environ-
mental Regulation, 2016 UTAH L. REv. 1, 29 (2016) (citing COOL as an example of
information disclosure in the context of "neoliberal environmental regulation,"
which "allows consumers to choose food products that did not travel so far to mar-
ket.").
229 See Mark Cooper, Open Communications Platforms: The Physical Infra-
structure As the Bedrock of Innovation and Democratic Discourse in the Internet
Age, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 177, 183 (2003) (noting that "information
production exhibits the characteristics of a public good, with positive externalities
and high first copy costs.").
230 See, e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2021, 2035 (1996) (noting that "social norms are often a function of existing
information."); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 943, 1022 (1995) ("[E]ducation can alter social meanings. Social meanings
are collective goods, and collective action is needed (sometimes, at least) to change
collective goods. If there are existing social meanings that inhibit public policy ...
then one way of advancing social policy may be to reconstruct these social meanings
... if social meanings are collective goods, then there is an economic reason to
support [] education-for as neoclassical economics well understands, unregulated
markets will not supply a socially optimal amount of a public good."); Cooper, supra
note 229 ("Information creates benefits to bystanders that cannot be easily captured
in the transactions between the private parties to the exchange of information.").
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about them.2 31 Denying consumers information about origin sends a
message that the consumer is powerless to shape the market, and, per-
haps even more problematic, relieved of any responsibility to investi-
gate further.
Consumer awareness plays a role in food safety as well. A more
transparent food system is generally a safer one.232 COOL promotes
transparency and offers consumers an additional tool to guard against
food hazards.233 COOL's critics point out that the USDA never char-
acterized the policy as promoting a food safety objective.234 The
USDA's refusal to invoke food safety, however, may reflect the
Obama Administration's competing trade liberalization priorities more
than the nature of COOL. In an outbreak scenario, origin labeling can
clearly help consumers to act on food safety concerns. Indeed, the 2003
detection of mad cow disease in Canadian cattle imports acted as a
catalyst for passing the first COOL rules.235 More recently, Brazilian
investigators announced that large meatpackers in the country had
bribed inspectors to rubberstamp rotten and salmonella-contaminated
meant, some of which was exported.236 Governmental authorities have
responsibility for keeping all food safe, regardless of origin. In reality,
however, recalls and import restrictions may be slow to take place. In
response to the receixt Brazilian meat scandal, for example, USDA has
231 See, e.g. Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie Alan, The Effect of Information on
Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q. J. OF
ECON. 2, 409 (2003); Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws
on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J. OF L. AND
ECON. 2 (2000), available at https://msu.edu/-conlinmi/teach-
ing/EC860/voluntarydisclosure/dmathios.pdf.
232 See generally MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: THE POLITICS OF FOOD SAFETY
(2010).
233 See, e.g. Alexia Brunet Marks, The Risks We Are Willing to Eat: Food Im-
ports and Safety, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 125, 151 (2015) ("There is also evidence of
the United States lowering health and safety standards to accommodate other multi-
lateral trading rules . . . The most current example regards COOL and the WTO
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement ('TBT')."); Sara Gonzalez-Rothi Kronenthal,
Mad Cow Disease: Is There an App for That?, 7 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 445, 467 (2015) (arguing for the creation of a database tracking in-
stances of mad cow disease that "will maximize the value of COOL to individual
consumers because the information provided will give meaning and context to the
countr-of-origin designation.").
23 See, e.g., Conaway Commentary, supra note 13.
235 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Mad Cow Case Heightens Debate on Food Label-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A16.
236 See Simon Romero, Brazil's Largest Food Companies Raided in Tainted
Meat Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2017, at A7.
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continued to allow imports from that country despite major U.S. trad-
ing partners - including Canada, Mexico, the European Union, Japan,
South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, and Uruguay - implementing
partial or total bans. 237
Some consumers may have lower risk thresholds as well. A
consumer may learn of an outbreak of Salmonella Poona caused by
cucumbers from Mexico and avoid purchasing those products,238 or
she may avoid shrimp from China after learning that many Chinese
shrimp farmers use antibiotics and other drugs banned under U.S. law,
whose residues may be carcinogenic, increase the risk of an antibiotic
resistant infection, or otherwise pose a danger. 239 Without origin infor-
mation, news of adulteration or outbreaks might lead the same con-
sumer to avoid buying cucumbers or shrimp altogether, 240 or to take no
action. Like other origin labeling requirements, COOL empowered
consumers to take action in response to food safety threats, and thereby
advanced food safety in the aggregate.
Finally, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out when it rejected the
AMI's First Amendment challenge to COOL, origin labeling boasts of
6 ...,241
"an historical pedigree that lifts it well above 'idle curiosity.
Origin labeling requirements are "among the oldest disclosure require-
ments in federal law," dating back to the 1890s.24 2 Not only the federal
government but also many states have a long tradition of imposing
237 See Truman Lewis, Consumer groups ask feds to ban meat and poultry from
Brazil, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, March 29, 2017, https://www.consumeraf-
fairs.com/news/consumer-groups-ask-feds-to-ban-meat-and-poultry-from-brazil-
032917.html.
238 Multistate Outbreak ofSalmonella Poona Infections Linked to Imported Cu-
cumbers (Final Update), CDC (Mar. 18, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.cdc.gov/sal-
monella/poona-09-15/.
239 Important Alert 16-131: Detention Without Physical Examination of Aqua-
cultured, Shrimp, Dace, and Eel from China-Presence ofNew Animal Drugs and/or
Unsafe Food Additives, FDA (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.ac-
cessdata.fda.gov/cms ia/importalert_33.html.
240 In this way, lack of origin information affects industry more broadly and
some legislators cited the need to protect constituents in support of the 2002 COOL
legislation. For example, Representative Thurman of Florida noted that COOL might
have spared melon growers in her district from the fallout associated with a food-
borne illness outbreak tied to imported produce. Farm Security Act of 2001: Motion
to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 2646, 107th Cong. 47 (2002) (statement of Rep. Thur-
man), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-04-24/pdf/CREC-
2002-04-24-ptl -PgH1 537-7.pdf.
241 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
242 Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer "Right
to Know", 58 ARIz. L. REv. 421, 466 (2016).
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these labeling requirements. 243 And the United States is not alone in
consecrating the notion that a consumer should "by knowing where the
goods were produced, be able to bu or refuse to buy them, if such
marking should influence his will." 2 4 Other countries continue to re-
quire country-of-origin labeling that parallels or exceeds the now de-
funct American rules.24 5 Indeed, the USDA seems to have modeled its
2013 rule on the European Commission requirement that producers la-
bel where beef is "born, raised, slaughtered and cut," in effect since
2002.246 The key distinction between European and American COOL
appears to be that a large, highly consolidated North American meat-
packing industry disfavors the American regulation.247
In conclusion, a closer examination of COOL's costs and its
value to consumers should dispel the notion that it simply camouflaged
a protectionist attack on foreign competitors. This leaves the question
of whether the WTO nevertheless correctly invalidated the policy on
the basis of some narrower factors. The next part argues that it did not.
243 Id. (citing U.S. GEN ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-780,
COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR USDA AND
INDUSTRY TO IMPLEMENT CHALLENGING ASPECTS OF THE NEW LAW
44 (2003)).
244 United States v. Friedlaender & Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 297, 302 (1940).
245 See, Melissa Lind, The EU's New Country of Origin Labeling Rules For
Meats: What You Need To Know, FOOD ONLINE (Apr. 8, 2015),
https://www.foodonline.com/doc/the-eu-s-new-country-of-origin-labeling-rules-
for-meats-what-you-need-to-know-0001 (describing new European regulations).
246 Commission Regulation 2000/1760 of July 17, 2000 (EC) and Commission
Regulation 2000/1825/ EC of Aug. 25, 2000 (EC) establish a system for the identifi-
cation and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labeling of beef and beef
products. From January 2002, in order to give the consumers more detailed infor-
mation on the beef on sale, the beef label will have to include information on the beef
on sale, the beef label will have to include information about where the animal was
born, raised, slaughtered and cut, plus a traceability number and the approval num-
bers of slaughterhouse and of cutting plant; see J. Claude Cheftel, Food andNutrition
Labeling in the European Union (2005), available at http://www.innova-
uy.info/docs/presentaciones/20050930/2005PPTJeanClaudeCheftel.pdf (Fr.).
247 For its part, Canada allows producers to label meat and poultry "Product of
Canada" if it is made from animals that "have spent a period of at least 60 days in
Canada prior to slaughter in Canada." See Origin Claims: Guidelines for "Product
of Canada" and "Made in Canada" Claims, CAN. FOOD INSPECTION AGENCY (Mar.
16, 2014), http://www.inspection.gc.ca/food/labelling/foodlabellingforindus-
try/origin/eng/13936222 2 2 1 4 0/1 3 9 3 6 2 2 5 15592?chap=0#c5 (Can.).
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B. The Appellate Body's decision on COOL fails to establish
meaningful protections for public interest regulations and
offers little guidance to policymakers
The Appellate Body's deliberations in US-COOL go on for
hundreds of pages, but the central thesis in both its 2012 and 2014
opinions was that the benefits of COOL did not justify the costs. More
specifically, the value of the information that COOL offered to con-
sumers, and the number of consumers that COOL reached, were "dis-
proportionate" to the expenses that the meatpacking industry had to
incur to keep track of what meat came from what animal. Yet the Ap-
pellate Body gave no indication of what, if any, alternative labeling
requirement might not be "disproportionate" and its analysis suggests
that a wide range of "technical regulations" aimed at protecting con-
sumers, national security, human health or safety, animal or plant life
or health, or the environment, may be vulnerable to challenge.2 4 8
One reason for this is the stringent level of review that the Ap-
pellate Body applies to technical regulations. Consistent with its prior
jurisprudence, the Appellate Body in US-COOL followed an estab-
lished analytical framework that culminated in "strict scrutiny" like re-
view of the regulation's compliance with TBT Article 2.249 That frame-
work begins with the Appellate Body determining whether the
challenged policy, regardless of "outside values or legitimate regula-
tory purposes," has a "detrimental impact on competitive opportuni-
ties" of importers. 2 5 0
The Appellate Body held that COOL's compliance costs rep-
resented such a "detrimental impact" because they encouraged proces-
sors-and in particular the large meat processors that dominate the
American market 2 5 1-to buy only American cattle and hogs. The evi-
dence for this impact was weak, however, as commentators pointed
248 See TBT Agreement, supra note 99, art. 2.
249 Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Govern-
ance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT'L L. 9, 46 (2016).25 0 id
251 See Shi-Ling Hsu, Scale Economies, Scale Externalities: Hog Farming and
the Changing American Agricultural Industry, 94 OR. L. REV. 23, 58 (2015) ("Under
the watch of GIPSA and its predecessor agency, the market share of the top four pork
packers increased from 40% in 1990 to 66% in 2007. Beef packing is even more
concentrated, with the top four producers owning 83.5% of the market in 2007. Three
of the top four hog packers are also the top three beef packers -- Tyson Foods, Swift
& Co., and Cargill -- while the top pork packer is the behemoth Smithfield Foods,
which slaughters over twenty-seven million hogs per year, good for 26% of the total
market."); See also CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET: THE SECRET
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out following the first Appellate Body ruling. 2 5 2 Difficulty complying
with COOL's mixed origin requirements may have led some proces-
sors to buy only American meat. But it may have led others, particu-
larly those near the borders, to seek out more imported meat in order
to take advantage of the "Label D" category for exclusively Mexican
or Canadian sourced meat. Other factors, such as the value-added in
each country for multi-origin products, may have overshadowed the
effect of COOL's segregation requirements altogether. The Appellate
Body and the earlier Panel, however, cited evidence only of certain
"effects" on imports, such as discounts or reduced demand for im-
ported livestock in some markets. The decisions "contained absolutely
no information on the question of attribution." 2 5 3 In other words, no
evidence indicated that COOL actually caused the "detrimental im-
pact" on importers that was documented in the WTO hearings. The
Appellate Body's second decision did little to address the inadequacy.
This loose standard for what qualifies as a "detrimental impact"
means that not much stands between a technical regulation and strict
scrutiny. The Appellate Body applies a "rather deferential standard" to
determine whether a given regulatory objective is legitimate, and then
it applies "strict scrutiny" of the policy instrument's specific fea-
tures.2 5 4
Before considering why COOL failed this "strict scrutiny," the
contrast between this level of review and that applied to COOL by the
D.C. Circuit deserves mention. In making its determination of whether
COOL violated the First Amendment, the D.C. Circuit asked whether
the USDA had articulated "a substantial government interest" and
whether it had shown that "the disclosure is purely factual, uncontro-
versial, not unduly burdensome, and reasonably related to the Govern-
ment's interest." 2 As Judge Rogers' concurrence points out, these re-
quirements "are far more stringent than mere rational basis review," 256
but they nevertheless offer a much higher level of deference than strict
scrutiny review, which shifts the burden to the state of showing that
the challenged provision is "narrowly tailored" or the "least restrictive
alternative" for promoting its interest.257
TAKEOVER OF AMERICA'S FOOD BUSINESS (2014) (describing the "chickenization"
of the American hog and cattle markets).
252 Mavroidis & Saggi, supra note 19, at 314.
253 Id.
254 Howse, The WTO 20 Years On, supra note 249.
255 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
256 Id.
257 Indeed, the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory and fatal in fact" has
been dubbed "one of the most famous epithets in American constitutional law." Peter
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Another way of understanding strict scrutiny is that it "ensures
that courts are most skeptical in cases in which it is highly predictable
that illegitimate motives are at work."2 5 8 In US-COOL, this presump-
tion of illegitimacy appears to permeate the Appellate Body's balanc-
ing test to determine whether a "disconnect" existed between "(i) the
informational requirements imposed on upstream producers; (ii) the
nature and accuracy of the information conveyed on the labels; and
(iii) the proportion of the collected information that is exempt from
being communicated to consumers." 2 5 9 Based on these factors, the Ap-
pellate Body concluded that COOL's impacts did not "stem exclu-
sively from legitimate regulatory distinctions." 2 6 0
Each of the three factors played a role in the Appellate Body's
invalidation of COOL. The evidence of COOL's disproportionate "in-
formational requirements" largely reflected the costs to importers of
complying with the rule. As already mentioned, the first WTO panel
cited the USDA's estimates of COOL's compliance costs that ex-
ceeded more conservative estimates by more than an order of magni-
tude.261 The Appellate Body also determined that the 2013 revised
COOL regulation would increase compliance costs by eliminating a
"mixed label" exemption that it had previously ruled was meaningless,
and it noted the difficulty of processing animals from both Mexico and
Canada at the same facility, a scenario that it conceded was not "com-
mon."
262
For the second factor, the Compliance Panel cited two sources
J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2000) citing Gerald Gun-
ther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1972); but see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 803 (2006)
(noting the theory that "strict scrutiny invokes heightened review as a means of
providing vigorous judicial protection for core rights while nevertheless pragmati-
cally allowing "a safety valve in the event of a 'hard case,' where the governmental
and societal reasons for infringing upon an individual right are particularly strong (or
in the language of the doctrine, 'compelling')."
258 Winkler, supra note 257 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995
Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 78 (1996)).
259 2012 Appellate Body Report, supra note 100, at 154.
260 2015 Appellate Body Report, supra note 100, at 169, 173.
261 See 2011 Panel Report, supra note 85 (quoting USDA chief economist testi-
mony that "Several studies have estimated the costs for the cattle/beef and hog/pork
sectors at up to several billion dollars annually, after examining all costs for the entire
supply chain, including segregation and identity preservation.").
262 Id. at 86.
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of labeling inaccuracies. First, the rule did not require retailers to pro-
vide enough information about where animals were raised. Specifi-
cally, the rule allowed retailers to label as "raised in the United States"
livestock imported into the U.S. more than fifteen days prior to slaugh-
ter. This created the potential for labeling inaccuracies in two ways.
First, for an animal born in Canada (or Mexico), raised in Canada (or
Mexico) for part of its life, and then imported to the United States more
than fifteen days prior to slaughter, the required label would not indi-
cate that the animal was both "raised in" Canada (or Mexico) and in
the United States. But of course, the label would note both that the
animal was "born in Canada" and "slaughtered in the United States."
Thus, a consumer could surmise that the animal was at least partly
"raised in" the two countries. The consumer would not know if the
time that an animal was "raised in" the unlisted country was signifi-
cant, but neither the Compliance Panel nor the Appellate Body offered
any evidence of consumers demanding such a high level of specificity,
or an explanation of why this "potential for labeling inaccuracy" might
hold significance.
A second way in which the "raised in" labeling rule might
cause confusion would occur if an animal was born in the United
States, raised in Canada (or Mexico), and then imported to the United
States more than fifteen days prior to slaughter. Such a scenario could
lead to a misleading omission of Canada (or Mexico) from the label.
But it provides little support for the WTO decisions because no evi-
dence exists of anyone importing and exporting cattle and hogs to and
from the United States in such a manner. Nor is there any evidence of
food animals being born, raised and slaughtered in three different
countries, another potential source of labeling inaccuracy for the Com-
pliance Panel, 263 which the Appellate Body reasoned that it sufficiently
"discounted or disregarded" to account for the scenarios' seeming ir-
relevance. 2 64
Under the third and final prong of the Article 2.1 test, the anal-
ysis is arguably more intuitive, but hardly satisfying. COOL exempted
food service establishments, certain processors (e.g. of smoked hams),
and small "mom and pop" type stores from its labeling require-
265
ments. As a result, the Compliance Panel pointed out, "between
57.7% and 66.7% of beef and between 83.5% and 84.1% of pork mus-
cle cuts consumed in the US convey no consumer information on
263 2014 Panel Report, supra note 150, at 101 (noting that "the design of Label
C rules under the amended COOL measure may allow - and possibly require - omis-
sion of actual countries of raising...").
264 Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11, at 96.
265 2013 Rule, supra note 148.
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origin despite imposing an upstream recordkeeping burden on produc-
ers and processors. Put another way, because COOL only targeted
large retailers, and failed to apply to some 600,000 restaurants, among
other establishments,2 67 it created a "disproportion." This attack on
COOL's scope is particularly disconcerting because most regulations
carve out exceptions or otherwise make accommodations for compet-
ing policy priorities, and the decision fails to introduce any meaningful
limiting principle to establish when a policy is sufficiently comprehen-
sive.
Indeed, the Appellate Body's decision leaves uncertain
whether the United States could even adopt a voluntary origin labeling
standard, one of the alternatives to COOL proposed by Canada in its
claim that the rule was "more trade restrictive than necessary" in vio-
lation of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Following the Appellate
Body's first ruling on COOL, trade law scholars criticized the body's
refusal "to address the central question raised by this dispute: Does
there exist an alternative to COOL that is less trade restrictive?" 26 8 This
question only rose in prominence after the U.S. retooled COOL to
make it "WTO-compliant.", 2 6 9 Yet instead of tethering its rejection of
the 2013 rule to a specific set of facts or conditions that might guide
policymakers, the Appellate Body once again dodged the issue, rea-
soning that it had insufficient evidence to evaluate the alternatives.
This decision is counterintuitive to say the least. If COOL ad-
vances a legitimate regulatory objective, and no less trade restrictive
alternative exists, then how can the rule's "detrimental impact," to use
the Appellate Body's language, not "stem exclusively from legitimate
regulatory distinctions"? Put another way, what alternative would
purge the illegitimate "regulatory distinctions" that bring COOL into
conflict with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement?
Perhaps the answer is none. The rationale that COOL falls short
of fulfilling its regulatory objective appears to condemn any effort to
formulate an alternative since "introducing more elaborate labelling
schemes would be even more susceptible to the charge of de facto dis-
crimination."270 On the other hand, a less elaborate scheme setting
standards on voluntary industry participation would presumably fall
prey to the charge that it fails to inform large numbers of consumers
and thus "impose[s] a disproportionate burden on producers and pro-
cessors of livestock that cannot be explained by the need to provide
266 2014 Panel Report, supra note 150, at 103.
267 Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11, at 154.
268 Mavroidis & Saggi, supra note 19, at 299.
269 2013 Rule, supra note 148.
270 Mavroidis & Saggi, supra note 19, at 314.
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origin information to consumers."271 The surest route for gun shy pol-
icymakers and regulators is to shelve COOL altogether.
This seems particularly true in light of the Appellate Body's
ruling that COOL also violated Article 111:4 of GATT 1994. This pro-
vision received relatively scant attention in the Appellate Body's re-
port, but its apparently sweeping breadth should raise further concerns.
According to the Compliance Panel, even if COOL's "detrimental im-
pacts" could be attributed to "legitimate regulatory distinctions," it
nevertheless conflicted with Article 111:4.272 The Appellate Body af-
firmed that ruling, and thus appeared to render superfluous its entire
analysis of COOL's regulatory "disconnect." Needless to say, neither
the Appellate Body's nor the Compliance Panel's decision suggests
how COOL could come into compliance with this provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The story of COOL lends credence to free trade critics' claims.
Most strikingly, it demonstrates how trade agreements can undermine
democratic accountability. COOL enjoyed popular support among
consumers, and it overcame and withstood a sustained lobbying cam-
paign against it in Congress, a well-funded lawsuit against it in the U.S.
court system, and an Obama Administration that never showed much
enthusiasm for implementing it. Only when the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism delivered its final verdict did COOL finally meet its
demise.
This is not to say that the WTO deserves all of the blame for
COOL's repeal. As one commentator on the WTO noted, "powerful
US domestic interests" and "the attitude of the Republican-dominated
Congress" played an important role in rolling back the policy. 2 7 3 in-
deed, if retaliation motivated legislators' support for repeal of COOL,
the timing of the omnibus seems rather hasty. Because the arbitrator
awarded a lesser retaliation award, Canada still needed to revise its list
of targeted goods. The revised list presumably would have changed the
calculus for some members of Congress. And even after Canada pub-
lished the revised list, the U.S. would have had time to revise COOL
before Canada was authorized to levy retaliation.2 7 4
271 Arbitrator's Retaliation Determination, supra note 11, at 107.
272 2014 Panel Report, supra note 150, at 183.
273 Howse, The WTO 20 Years On, supra note 249, at 53.
274 See Anderson, supra note 176 (describing process for approving targeted
goods); David Yanofsky, The US successfully delayed the WTO's approval of $1
billion in retaliatory tariffs, QUARTZ (Dec. 19, 2015), https://qz.com/578034/the-us-
successfully-delayed-the-wtos-approval-of- 1 -billion-in-retaliatory-tariffs/ (noting
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Of course, the WTO gave no direction on how Congress may
have fixed COOL, and the Obama Administration eschewed proposals
to save COOL through informal negotiations with Canada and Mex-
ico.275 This refusal was significant. In previous trade disputes, the U.S.
has negotiated with winning litigants to forestall the implementation
of retaliatory tariffs. For example, the U. S. gave Brazil $300 million
to settle a longstanding challenge to federal cotton subsidies.2 7 6 In the
case of a $21.5 million award to Antigua related to the U. S.'s regula-
tion of internet gambling, the U.S. Trade Representative has reportedly
pressured the island nation not to follow through on the judgment's
suggested means of enforcement-the manufacture and sale of "pi-
rated" music, movies, and software under U.S. copyright. 2 7 7 Canada
and Mexico may have been susceptible to similar tactics, but in the run
up to COOL's repeal, Obama Administration officials appeared more
interested in soliciting Canadian and Mexican cooperation in the
TPP.278
Many of the same powerful industry interests that supported
the TPP also cheered the Obama Administration's position on COOL,
and they made the rounds in Congress. 2 7 9 With surveys showing pop-
ular support for COOL stronger than ever, Congressional leaders un-
doubtedly saw in the omnibus bill an opportunity to appease key cam-
paign contributors while avoiding an unpopular up or down vote. In
this sense, the WTO's final ruling on retaliation was a critical catalyst
for action. COOL's opponents focused almost exclusively on the im-
minent threat of trade retaliation as the rationale for repealing COOL,
that the WTO had not finalized its authorization of retaliation at the time that Con-
gress Passed repeal of COOL).
2 - Sanders & Wallach, supra note 55 (noting that "consumer groups wrote to
the administration requesting it use the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) ne-
gotiations as leverage to demand that Canada and Mexico drop the [COOL] case
instead of rolling back the policy. But they received no response.").
276 United States and Brazil Reach Agreement to End WTO Cotton Dispute, OFF.
OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Oct., 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/20 14/October/United-States-and-Brazil-Reach-Agreement-to-
End-WTO-Cotton-Dispute.
277 See Haley Hintz, Antigua Seeks Compromise in WTO Online Gambling Dis-
pute, FLUSH DRAW (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.flushdraw.net/news/antigua-seeks-
compromise-wto-online-gambling-dispute/; see also Vicki Needham, US, Indonesia
settle fight over clove cigarettes, THE HILL (Oct. 3, 2014, 5:43 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/219755-us-indonesia-settle-clove-cigarette-dispute
(describing settlement of clove cigarette import ban litigation with Indonesia).
278 See Sanders & Wallach, supra note 55.
279 Chang, supra note 60, at 702 (detailing the contributions received by key
opponents of the initial legislation).
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and made the case that the U.S. could not wait for a more accountable
legislative process. 280 Following passage of the omnibus, the path for-
ward for the consumer advocates and farmers that supported COOL
has looked grim indeed. Some have championed voluntary labeling
rules, 2 8 1 but Canadian officials indicated that they would challenge a
"voluntary COOL" regime as well. 2 8 2 This seems like a fairly credible
threat since the Appellate Body's decision says nothing about whether
a regulation on voluntary labeling would comply with Article 2.1.283
Perhaps the clearest message from the Appellate Body's deci-
sions regarding COOL is that the determination of which regulations
are "protectionist" lies primarily with the member countries that file a
complaint. This arrangement gives powerful corporate interests a huge
amount of influence behind the scenes, and it underscores the need for
reform. In 2010, Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and Rep. Mike
Michaud (D-Maine) introduced the Trade Reform, Accountability, De-
velopment and Employment (TRADE) Act, which would require a re-
view of existing trade pacts, require congressional involvement in the
negotiations of new agreements, and set forth limits on the extent to
which agreements can override domestic environmental, public health,284Te efood and product safety, and other regulations. The legislation has
gone nowhere but it continues to serve as a rallying focus for many
trade deal opponents.
By contrast, the trade reforms defined by the Trump Admin-
istration, and the Republican Party more broadly, are less clear. The
280 See, e.g. Conaway Commentary, supra note 13.
281 Andrew Jerome, NFU Urges Nation's Ag Leaders, Organizations to Support
Voluntary COOL as Easiest, Best Option to Resolve WTO Trade Dispute Quickly,
NAT'L FARMERS UNION (Oct. 20, 2015), https://nfu.org/2015/10/20/nfu-urges-na-
tions-ag-leaders-organizations-to-support-voluntary-cool-as-easiest-best-option-to-
resolve-wto-trade-dispute-quickly/.
282 Spencer Chase, Canada opposed to voluntary COOL in the US, AGRIPULSE
(Jan. 14, 2016, 4:02 PM), http://www.agri-pulse.com/Canada-opposed-to-voluntary-
COOL-in-the-US-01 142016.asp.
283 Recall that the latest Dolphins-Tuna case involved a voluntary labeling
scheme. SeeDS 381: United States-Measures concerning the importation, marketing
and sale of tuna and tuna products, WTO, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop e/dispu e/casese/ds381 e.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
284 Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and Employment Act of 2009,
H.R. 3012, 111th Cong., available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-con-
gress/senate-bill/282 1.
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current GOP platform promotes "a winning trade policy" with agree-
ments that "adequately protect U.S. interests, U.S. sovereignty." 2 8 5
What that means remains to be determined.
285 Restoring the American Dream, GOP:REPUBLICAN PLATFORM,
https://www.gop.com/platform/restoring-the-american-dream/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2017).
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